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INTRODUCTION 
Both the right to proceed pro se and liberal pleading standards 
reflect the modern civil legal system’s emphasis on protecting access 
to courts.1  Self-representation has firm roots in the notion that all in-
dividuals, no matter their status or wealth, are entitled to air griev-
ances for which they may be entitled to relief.2  Access, then, must not 
be contingent upon retaining counsel, lest the entitlement become a 
mere privilege denied to certain segments of society.  Similarly, be-
cause pleading is the gateway by which litigants access federal courts, 
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure purposefully 
eschewed strict sufficiency standards.3  In their place, the drafters in-
stituted a regime in which a complaint quite easily entitled its author 
to discovery in order to prevent dismissal of cases before litigants have 
had an adequate opportunity to demonstrate their merit.4 
Far from just articulating a common systemic value, though, the 
right to prosecute one’s own case without assistance of counsel in fact 
 
1 See, e.g., Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Few 
issues . . . are more significant than pleading standards, which are the key that opens 
access to courts.”); Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles:  The Need to Curb Extreme 
Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1546 
(2005) (noting that “[o]pen access to the courts for all citizens” is one of the principles 
upon which the right to prosecute one’s own case is founded). 
2 See Swank, supra note 1, at 1546 (discussing the importance of self-representation 
to the fundamental precept of equality before the law). 
3 See Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules (1938) (statement of Edgar Tolman), 
reprinted in RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 301-13 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938). 
4 See Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible 
Denial:  Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal? 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 
141, 148 (2009), http://pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (Bur-
bank, Rebuttal) (asserting that the drafters of the Federal Rules objected to a technical 
pleading regime because it would “too often cut[] off adjudication on the merits”).  
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depends significantly upon liberal pleading standards.5  The ability to 
file a “short and plain statement of the claim”6 mitigates the impact 
that the choice to proceed pro se has on litigants’ access to discovery 
by reducing the number of technicalities and requirements the satis-
faction of which demands legal expertise.  However, recognizing that 
transsubstantive pleading standards do not sufficiently account for the 
capability differential between represented and unrepresented liti-
gants, the Supreme Court fashioned a rule of special solicitude for pro 
se pleadings.7  Accordingly, “pro se complaint[s], ‘however inartfully 
pleaded,’ [are] held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers.’”8 
Notably, however, the Court granted such leniency, or “liberal con-
struction,” to pro se pleadings against the backdrop of Conley v. Gib-
son’s undemanding “no set of facts” standard.9  The Court’s failure to 
explain how pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed10 indicates its 
belief that the standard was already lenient enough to render a detailed 
 
5 Cf. Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  The Last Phase—
Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. 
J. 976, 976-77 (1937) (commenting that liberal pleading rules were necessary to miti-
gate information asymmetries between plaintiffs and defendants that often led to pre-
mature dismissal of suits).  Notably, in no suits are such information asymmetries more 
apparent than those in which pro se litigants sue represented adversaries.  These types 
of suits comprise the vast majority in which pro se litigants appear.  Cf. Jonathan D. Ro-
senbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se Cases:  A Study 
of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 323 
(showing that the majority of pro se cases involve unrepresented plaintiffs who sue go-
vernmental defendants).   
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).  
7 See Robert Bacharach & Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial Advocacy in Pro Se Litigation:  A 
Return to Neutrality, 42 IND. L. REV. 19, 22-26 (2009) (noting that courts created ways to 
ensure that meritorious pro se suits would not be dismissed simply because the litigants 
lacked legal knowledge and experience, one of which was liberal construction). 
8 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 
519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam)). 
9 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”), 
abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007).  This standard epi-
tomized the notice-pleading regime envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules, who 
emphasized discovery as the stage at which a claim’s true merit would come to light, ra-
ther than pleading.  See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 987, 990 (2003) (“With merits determination as the goal, the Federal Rules create 
a new procedural system that massively deemphasizes the role of pleadings.”). 
10 See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 29-30 (asserting that because the 
Supreme Court never defined the “degree of relaxation” afforded pro se pleadings in 
comparison to the liberal notice pleading standard applicable to all litigants, lower 
courts adopted different iterations of the rule). 
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articulation of the practice unnecessary to prevent premature dismissal 
of meritorious cases.  However, with Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly11 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 12 retiring the “no set of facts” standard and ratifying 
the means by which lower courts dismissed more disfavored cases un-
der Conley,13 liberal construction as presently practiced is not—if it ever 
was—sufficient to protect pro se litigants’ access to courts. 
The new plausibility standard14 with which courts now determine 
the adequacy of complaints disproportionately harms pro se litigants.15  
First, the Supreme Court’s instruction that “conclusory” facts not be 
presumed true when determining a claim’s plausibility16 will affect 
those who (1) lack the resources to develop facts before discovery, 
(2) bring claims requiring them to plead information exclusively within 
the opposition’s possession, or (3) rely on forms in drafting complaints.  
Pro se litigants typify the parties who demonstrate all three behaviors.  
Second, determining whether the remaining allegations permit a plaus-
ible inference of wrongdoing, as per the Supreme Court’s instruction,17 
is a wildly subjective endeavor.  Courts are likely—no doubt uninten-
tionally—to draw inferences that disfavor pro se litigants because their 
“judicial common sense” judgments of what is plausible result from a 
 
11 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
12 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
13 See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435-37 (1986) (explaining how the reemer-
gence of fact pleading resulted from lower courts’ refusals to accept conclusory allega-
tions as sufficient under the Federal Rules in particular categories of suits).  
14 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (requiring a complaint to allege “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).  
15 See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:  Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Em-
pirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 615 (2010) (observing a substantially greater increase 
in the rate of dismissal of pro se suits than represented suits post-Iqbal). 
16 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (“[T]he allegations are conclusory and not entitled 
to be assumed true.”); Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 579 (“Iqbal invites judges 
to . . . eliminate from consideration all the complaint’s conclusory allegations . . . .”).  
The parsing of a complaint into conclusory and nonconclusory factual allegations dis-
regards the Federal Rules’ express disavowal of fact pleading, along with their re-
quirement that all facts be presumed true when determining the adequacy of a com-
plaint.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American 
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 115 (2009) (noting that the drafters of the Federal Rules 
rejected fact pleading because of the impossibility of distinguishing between conclu-
sions and facts); Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 563 (discussing courts’ obligations to cre-
dit as true all factual allegations in a complaint).    
17 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a 
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise 
to an entitlement to relief.”). 
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drastically different set of background experiences and values.18  The 
admixture of these two steps portends serious trouble for pro se liti-
gants, who, even before the plausibility standard, did not fare well de-
spite the leeway afforded their complaints.19 
Accordingly, this Comment reevaluates the effectiveness of liberal 
construction as a bulwark against premature dismissal of pro se com-
plaints.  Part I discusses pro se litigation generally.  It documents the 
rise of the federal pro se docket, the reasons individuals choose to 
proceed pro se, and the unique challenges they face as a result of that 
choice.  Because courts established liberal construction in response to 
those challenges, Part I ends by considering how this leniency oper-
ates in practice.  Part II examines in detail the new plausibility stan-
dard articulated by the Supreme Court in Iqbal.  Particularly, it dissects 
the Court’s two-pronged approach to demonstrate how each step is 
uniquely hostile to pro se litigants.  This hostility explains the dispro-
portionate impact that the decision has had and will continue to have 
on their complaints.  Part III suggests a way to reinvigorate the leeway 
afforded pro se litigants and bring self-representation closer to epito-
mizing our system’s goal of providing equal court access.  Specifically, 
Part III advocates for (1) limiting disregard of “conclusory” factual al-
legations in pro se pleadings and (2) increasing transparency with re-
spect to the inferences drawn against pro se litigants. 
I.  PRO SE LITIGATION AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION 
To evaluate liberal construction effectively, it is vital to understand 
the origins and characteristics of pro se litigation generally.  Recount-
ing the roots from which the right to proceed pro se developed and 
the current prevalence of pro se cases in federal court demonstrates the 
importance of maintaining formidable protections against early dismis-
sal.  Moreover, dispelling common assumptions about why individuals 
proceed pro se shows that their rate of dismissal may be disproportio-
nately greater than the rate at which they file unmeritorious claims.  
Thus, liberal construction has earned a reevaluation to ensure that it 
properly accomplishes the goals for which it was originally established. 
 
18 Cf. Burbank, supra note 16, at 118 (suggesting that reliance on “judicial expe-
rience and common sense,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950, invites “cognitive illiberalism,” a 
phenomenon that negatively affects classes of disfavored litigants). 
19 See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 615 (noting that, under Conley, courts dismissed 
sixty-seven percent of pro se cases). 
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A.  The Right to Proceed Pro Se 
Like many elements of the American legal system, the ability to 
civilly prosecute one’s own case has its origins in British common 
law.20  Historically, these ties were so strong, in fact, that “[t]he 
Founders believed that self-representation was a basic right of a free 
people.”21  As such, our early legal regimes heavily guarded the abili-
ty to proceed pro se; their commitment demonstrates both egalita-
rian and democratic ideals. 
First, a fundamental precept of American law is that financial status 
should neither determine access to courts nor substantially alter the 
outcomes of cases.22  Individuals who are unable to afford attorneys 
should not be denied a forum in which to air their grievances.23  To en-
sure that they are not, any party to a case has long been able to proceed 
without a lawyer.  Importantly, however, considerable “anti-lawyer sen-
timent” also firmly ingrained the right to self-representation into the 
American system.24  This sentiment emphasizes that self-representation 
safeguards were not solely intended to protect the poor’s access to 
courts; they also empowered citizens of all types to have their own voic-
es heard, rather than speaking exclusively through their lawyers. 
The Sixth Amendment protects the constitutional right to 
represent oneself as a criminal defendant.25  By contrast, however, the 
 
20 See Nina Ingwer VanWormer, Help at Your Fingertips:  A Twenty-First Century 
Response to the Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983, 987 (2007) (tracing the 
right to represent oneself in federal court to medieval England, and to the Magna 
Carta in particular). 
21 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 830 n.39 (1975). 
22 See Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 374-75 (2005) 
(noting that the “American legal ideal is that both the wealthy and the pauper could 
have access to the courts and could be treated equally with the resulting decisions be-
ing as fair as possible”). 
23 See id. at 375 (“The development of pro se rights in the United States has been 
tied to the rights of indigents to have access to the courts.”). 
24 See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 826-27 (discussing American colonists’ fervent dis-
trust of lawyers as responsible for their insistence on maintaining the right to proceed 
pro se); Jona Goldschmidt, Cases and Materials on Pro Se Litigation and Related Issues, THE 
PRO SE LAW CENTER (May 1–4, 1997), http://www.pro-selaw.org/cases.asp (providing 
references to research pertaining to the anti-lawyer sentiment from which the right to 
self-representation emerged). 
25 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 (“The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely 
that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the 
right to make his defense. . . . [T]he right to self-representation . . . is thus necessarily 
implied by the structure of the Amendment.”).  So firm are the historical roots from 
which the right to defend oneself from criminal prosecution arose that in sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century England, felony defendants were actually required, not just 
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Supreme Court has not deemed the right to proceed pro se as a civil 
litigant to be constitutionally guaranteed, despite its longstanding 
recognition in the Anglo-American legal tradition.26  Nevertheless, 
Congress codified the right to proceed pro se in federal civil suits by 
statute, even prior to the ratification of the Sixth Amendment.  The 
Judiciary Act of 1789, the right’s earliest statutory expression, pro-
nounced “[t]hat in all the courts of the United States, the parties may 
plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of 
such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts re-
spectively.”27  And Congress has, up to the present, continually codi-
fied the statutory right to proceed pro se in the United States Code 
using substantially similar language.28 
B.  The Federal Pro Se Docket 
1.  Evidence of a Burgeoning Caseload 
 
Although pro se litigation has been welcomed since the country’s 
founding, federal courts have recently experienced a staggering in-
 
entitled, to proceed without a lawyer, despite the earlier recognition of a right to coun-
sel in misdemeanor prosecutions and civil cases.  See id. at 823 (“By common law of 
that time, it was not representation by counsel but self-representation that was the 
practice . . . .”).  The tradition carried over into colonial America as well:  “[E]ven 
where counsel was permitted, the general practice continued to be self-representation 
[in criminal cases].”  Id. at 828.  
26 See Swank, supra note 1, at 1547 (“Whatever right there is to proceed pro se in 
criminal cases . . . has not been extended by the Supreme Court to civil cases.”); Van-
Wormer, supra note 20, at 986-87 (noting that, although criminal defendants’ right to 
refuse counsel is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, the guarantee 
“does not extend to civil litigants”).  Nonetheless, considerable debate has focused upon 
whether there is a constitutional right to self-representation in civil cases, despite its 
nonrecognition thus far by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Lois Bloom & Helen Hersh-
koff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL’Y 475, 484-85 (2002) (suggesting that the right to self-representation is 
constitutionally guaranteed); Candice K. Lee, Note, Access Denied:  Limitations on Pro Se 
Litigants’ Access to Courts in the Eighth Circuit, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1265 (2003) 
(commenting that courts have split on whether civil litigants have a constitutional right 
to proceed self-represented).  Some states, though, have definitively afforded constitu-
tional protection to civil litigants’ right to self-representation.  See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 1, para. XII (“No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either 
in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.”); 
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“A suitor in any court of this state has the right to prosecute 
or defend his suit, either in his own proper person or by an attorney.”). 
27 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (emphasis added). 
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006) (“In all courts of the United States the parties may 
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . .”). 
SCHNEIDER FINAL REVISED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2010  11:44 AM 
592 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 585 
crease in the proportion of pro se cases on their dockets.29  The trend 
is restricted neither to particular courts nor to certain types of suits.  
Rather, it has taken hold in both district and appellate courts, in cases 
involving prisoners and nonprisoners, and in claims ranging from civil 
rights to social security.30 
Presently, pro se litigants appear in approximately thirty-seven 
percent of all federal court cases.31  Specifically, in 2008, there were 
over 70,000 pro se cases in federal district court, as compared to ap-
proximately 200,000 represented cases.32  Unsurprisingly, prisoners 
account for a significant part of the federal pro se docket.  However, 
nonprisoners still appeared pro se in a significant number of district 
court cases in 2008—over 20,000, in fact.33  Thus, statistics belie the 
notion that the increase in pro se litigation can solely be attributed to 
prisoners’ incessant filing of habeas corpus petitions and claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.34 
 
29 See Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 439, 440-41 (2009) (describing the “inexorably rising tide of pro se liti-
gation” in American courts); see also VanWormer, supra note 20, at 988-91 (presenting 
data on the recent rise of pro se litigation in both state and federal courts). 
30 See Landsman, supra note 29, at 442 (asserting that, aside from civil rights 
claims, common claims pursued pro se also involved contract, labor, social security, 
and tort law). 
31 Swank, supra note 22, at 377 (citing Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. 
Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 103, 112 (2002)). 
32 See JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS:  2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 78 tbl.S-23 
(2008) (reporting that 70,948 pro se cases were heard in district courts in the twelve 
months preceding September 30, 2008, compared to 196,309 non–pro se cases). 
33 Id. 
34 In fact, two relatively recent statutory developments, the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), and the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28 and 42 U.S.C.), have severely limited 
prisoners’ ability to institute abusive litigation.  The PLRA, for example, requires pris-
oners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing civil actions and pay court filing 
fees in full, thereby reducing the portion of the pro se docket consisting of prisoner 
complaints.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006) (imposing full filing fees on prisoner 
litigants); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006) (codifying an administrative exhaustion re-
quirement); Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 322 (concluding that the sharp decrease in 
“[t]he number of inmate-filed cases . . . following the enactment of the PLRA” demon-
strates the enactment’s profound effect on pro se litigation).  Even more strictly, AED-
PA forbids prisoners from reinstituting previously adjudicated habeas claims.  28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).  It also prohibits successive habeas petitions containing claims not 
previously adjudicated absent approval from the relevant court of appeals and either 
(1) a basis in a new constitutional rule made retroactive on collateral review by the Su-
preme Court or (2) a showing that the factual predicate for the claim both could not 
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Moreover, the number of pro se appeals in federal court has simi-
larly increased in recent years to comprise a significant portion of the 
federal appellate docket.  For example, “nonprisoner pro se litigants 
consistently accounted for approximately thirteen to fourteen percent 
of all civil federal appeals filed annually between 1997 and 2004.”35  
From 2007 to 2008, though, federal courts of appeals experienced an 
eight percent increase in the number of civil pro se appeals, resulting 
in almost 20,000 in total.36  As a result, approximately sixty-two percent 
of all civil appeals are presently pursued pro se, with approximately 
14.5 percent involving nonprisoner pro se parties.37 
Clearly, then, pro se litigation shows no sign of subsiding.  It will 
only continue to grow as part of the federal docket, warranting an 
evaluation of the reasons individuals choose to proceed pro se.  With-
out understanding the underlying causes of the rising tide of pro se 
litigation, meaningful accommodations for self-represented litigants 
will continue to evade courts. 
2.  Reasons Litigants Represent Themselves 
Demonstrating that the leniency granted to pro se pleadings is in-
sufficient to protect meritorious claims from premature dismissal re-
quires first dispelling the notion that pro se claims virtually always lack 
merit.  If they did, courts would appropriately dismiss them at rates 
substantially higher than complaints submitted by counseled parties.  
But the well-documented reasons individuals choose to proceed pro 
se, which largely do not relate to the merits of their claims, undercut 
the veracity of that belief.38  In fact, “scholars and pro se litigants 
 
have been developed previously and provides clear and convincing evidence that a rea-
sonable factfinder would not have found the defendant guilty.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(2)–(3).  Despite these influential developments in prisoner litigation, the 
pro se docket continues to grow. 
35 VanWormer, supra note 20, at 989. 
36 See DUFF, supra note 32, at 45 tbl.S-4 (indicating an 8.2 percent increase from 
2007 to 2008 in civil pro se appeals). 
37 See id. (showing that of the 31,454 total civil appeals in 2008, 4595 involved 
nonprisoners acting pro se). 
38 This is not to deny that a lack of legal expertise often leads litigants to believe 
they have claims when they, in fact, do not.  It does, however, suggest that perhaps the 
number of unmeritorious pro se filings is not as high as many assert, and perhaps not 
high enough to explain the grossly disproportionate rate at which they are dismissed.  
Indeed, the high rate of dismissal of pro se cases cuts against the certainty that pro se 
claims lack merit because, without any discovery, it is difficult to discern the likelihood 
that a claim would have been successful—precisely the reason that drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules instituted a weak pleading regime in the first place.   
SCHNEIDER FINAL REVISED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2010  11:44 AM 
594 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 585 
themselves have identified several rational, well-considered reasons for 
deciding to do so.”39 
The assumption that a vast majority of pro se suits lack merit is 
primarily based upon a conception of the legal market as an accurate 
filter for unmeritorious cases; good claims attract representation, 
while bad ones do not.40  Under this theory, “the fact that no lawyer is 
willing to take on an action for damages suggests that someone know-
ledgeable about the law has looked at the matter and concluded that 
the plaintiff is unlikely to prevail.”41  However, this argument does not 
accurately capture the reasons that individuals forego representation, 
as it assumes that lawyers always accept “good” cases presented to 
them and that any litigant would accept representation if made avail-
able.42  Neither of these assumptions holds water. 
First, the most prevalent reason individuals choose to prosecute 
their own cases is inability to afford counsel.43  Certainly, the use of 
contingent fees mitigates to some extent the impact that lack of re-
 
39 VanWormer, supra note 20, at 991. 
40 See, e.g., Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) 
(Posner, J., concurring) (arguing against the appointment of counsel in a pro se suit 
for damages because the self-represented litigant could have hired an attorney on a 
contingent-fee basis, and concluding from his failure to do so that the claim lacked 
merit).  For a fuller critique of this argument, see generally Robin Paul Malloy, Fram-
ing the Market:  Representations of Meaning and Value in Law, Markets, and Culture, 51 
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2003).  
41 Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences:  Shockwaves in the Lower 
Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 867 (2008). 
42 See, e.g., Swank, supra note 22, at 378 (“[C]ommon belief is that all pro se civil 
litigants want counsel to represent them and that no person would choose to be pro se.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)).  The assumption that anyone 
intending to prosecute a claim desires counsel reflects, in a more refined manner, the 
saying that “one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.”  Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 852 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Yet the myriad reasons why individuals 
choose to proceed pro se in civil suits show that they may not be foolish for doing so 
and certainly cannot be blamed for the decision, as it often results from their insolven-
cy.  See VanWormer, supra note 20, at 991-92 (rejecting the joke as inaccurate in light 
of why individuals represent themselves).  Indeed, even in the criminal context—
where the stakes are higher—the saying’s accuracy has been called into question by a 
study that demonstrates that, in fact, “pro se felony defendants in state courts are con-
victed at rates equivalent to or lower than the conviction rates of represented felony 
defendants.”  Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation:  An Empirical 
Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 423 (2007). 
43 See Paul D. Healey, In Search of the Delicate Balance:  Legal and Ethical Questions in 
Assisting the Pro Se Patron, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 129, 133 (1998) (“Ultimately, the predomi-
nant reason for self-representation may be simple economics.”); Swank, supra note 22, 
at 378 (asserting that a majority of the public attributes the increase in pro se appear-
ances to the high cost of attorneys). 
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sources should have on acquiring counsel.  However, contingent fees 
do not effectively assist many claims that pro se litigants pursue, such 
as those for injunctive relief against civil rights abuses.44  Additionally, 
the contingent-fee structure still requires attorneys to front large sums 
of money to prosecute claims, which they will not do if the projected 
reward is too little (or nothing at all), despite a significant likelihood of 
success.45  Furthermore, there may not exist an accessible legal market 
in which a litigant can shop her claims, either because of geographical 
remoteness46 or incarceration.47  Thus, proponents of the efficient-legal-
market hypothesis ignore influential factors in lawyers’ decisions re-
garding whether to represent prospective clients, which relate less to 
their claims’ merit or likelihood of success and more to external factors. 
Furthermore, a significant number of pro se litigants in fact have 
funds to retain counsel, demonstrating that there are other, noneco-
 
44 See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 321, 326-27 (asserting that civil rights cases are 
most frequently pursued pro se and that approximately thirty percent of examined pro 
se cases sought a form of equitable relief).  Although attorneys’ fees would presumably 
be available if these types of suits are “successful,” the Supreme Court has limited the 
ability of civil rights attorneys to receive attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  See, 
e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 598 (2001) (holding that attorneys cannot collect fees under the “catalyst 
theory,” in which defendants voluntarily change their conduct in the way requested by 
plaintiffs); see also generally 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).  As a result, attorneys are neverthe-
less discouraged from pursuing such suits.  See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth 
Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:  The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the 
Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1089-92 (2007) (arguing that the 
Court’s holding in Buckhannon discourages civil rights claims). 
45 See Lee, supra note 26, at 1280-81 (doubting the market’s capacity to provide 
representation when the expected profit is too insignificant to attract counsel); Swank, 
supra note 22, at 380 (noting that where little or no profit motive exists, as where a po-
tential client is a defendant or has an unprofitable case, the market will not provide 
representation).  In addition to not fully accounting for lawyers’ calculus in accepting 
cases, the contingent-fee structure may cause parties to forego representation because 
the substantial portion of an award that goes to the attorney may prevent even success-
ful plaintiffs from being made whole.  If a party feels confident in the strength of her 
suit, then, she may choose to proceed without counsel in order to be more fully com-
pensated for the injuries suffered. 
46 See PATRICIA A. GARCIA, LITIGANTS WITHOUT LAWYERS:  COURTS AND LAWYERS 
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION 8 (2002) (asserting that some 
litigants “point to problems finding a lawyer” as a reason why they did not obtain coun-
sel); Frances H. Thompson, Access to Justice in Idaho, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1313, 1315 
(2002) (asserting that in certain rural locations, even if an individual wishes to hire an 
attorney, she may not be able to find one). 
47 See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 41, at 867 (excluding prisoners from the asser-
tion that the legal market adequately determines meritorious cases because they have 
“virtually no opportunity to search for counsel”). 
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nomic reasons for their decisions to proceed pro se.48  For example, 
pro se litigants have asserted that their distrust of lawyers or the legal 
system in general drove them to forego representation.49  Unlike these 
skeptical individuals, others who choose to prosecute claims without 
counsel seem to possess a more idealistic vision of our legal system.  
They believe that courts will come to the “right” or “just” result re-
gardless of their status as unrepresented litigants, a concept from 
which self-representation itself originated.50  There are numerous oth-
er factors, unrelated to merit, resulting in more litigants opting to not 
hire counsel, including increased literacy rates, a heightened sense of 
individualism, and the belief that litigation is simple enough to navi-
gate on one’s own.51  However, one remaining factor is particularly 
strong in demonstrating that many pro se suits do indeed have merit:  
consulted counsel often advise litigants to proceed unrepresented be-
cause they believe certain cases are easy enough for the litigants to 
pursue without assistance.52 
Thus, we should not assume that most pro se suits have been re-
viewed by lawyers who deemed them unworthy.  Rather, many of the 
reasons individuals choose to act without assistance of counsel may 
 
48 See, e.g., Bauer v. Comm’r, 97 F.3d 45, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging 
that a pro se litigant had the funds and ability to obtain counsel and was therefore not 
entitled to “preferential treatment”); Landsman, supra note 29, at 444-45 (emphasizing 
the presence among pro se litigants of “individuals who can afford counsel but choose 
not to hire a lawyer”); Swank, supra note 22, at 378 (citing a survey in which almost half 
of the pro se litigants “implied that they had the necessary funds to hire an attorney, 
but chose not to”); Spencer G. Park, Note, Providing Equal Access to Equal Justice:  A Sta-
tistical Study of Non-Prisoner Pro Se Litigation in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California in San Francisco, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 831 (1997) (“[T]he over-
whelming majority of pro se litigants, 72%, were not legally ‘indigent’ . . . .”).  
49 See Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice:  Meeting the 
Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 36 (2002) (discussing “anti-
lawyer sentiment” as a reason for increased pro se litigation); Eric J.R. Nichols, Note, 
Preserving Pro Se Representation in an Age of Rule 11 Sanctions, 67 TEX. L. REV. 351, 380 
(1988) (placing distrust of the legal system among the reasons why litigants choose to 
proceed pro se).  It seems, then, that the antilawyer sentiment partially responsible for 
solidifying self-representation as an element of the Anglo-American legal tradition has 
not dissipated, but rather continues to nurture its growth. 
50 See Swank, supra note 22, at 379 (presenting noneconomic reasons for which 
some litigants choose to represent themselves); see also supra Section I.A (discussing the 
foundations upon which the right to self-representation rests, including the notion 
that the retention of counsel should not substantially alter outcomes). 
51 See Swank, supra note 22, at 378-79 (listing factors that in recent years have con-
tributed to the growing inclination toward pro se litigation). 
52 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 46, at 1316 (asserting that thirty-one percent of 
pro se litigants in Idaho consulted counsel, and many were advised not to obtain repre-
sentation because “their case [wa]s simple enough for them to handle themselves”). 
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be largely unrelated to the validity of their claims, calling into ques-
tion the presumption of reduced merit that informally attaches to 
pro se complaints. 
3.  Challenges Facing Pro Se Litigants 
If more pro se litigants have potentially valid grievances than 
commonly believed, there must be other factors, aside from frivolity, 
that explain the grossly disproportionate rate at which their claims 
are dismissed.  These factors, consisting of the unique challenges 
faced by litigants proceeding pro se, manifest at the pleading stage 
of litigation to render their complaints more vulnerable to dismissal 
for failure to state a claim.53 
First, there exists significant bias against pro se litigants in the 
court system:  “Pro se litigants are regularly perceived in a negative 
manner; they are ‘most often attacked for the judicial inefficiencies 
many judges, attorneys, and observers believe they create.’”54  As a re-
sult, they are thought to be pests responsible for “clogging” up the 
court system.55  However, the evidence largely disproves these assess-
ments.  Indeed, studies have shown that cases with only represented 
parties consumed more time than56 and settled at essentially the same 
rate as their pro se counterparts.57  Aside from a sense that their claims 
 
53 See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 308-09 (discussing the methods by which over-
burdened courts summarily dispose of pro se cases). 
54 Swank, supra note 22, at 384 (quoting Buxton, supra note 31, at 114). 
55 See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION:  
A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 121 (1998) (quoting 
judges who expressed distaste for pro se litigants). 
56 Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 358-59. 
57 See, e.g., Buxton, supra note 31, at 145-46 (citing a study which found that civil 
pro se claims settled at a rate “virtually identical” to that of cases with represented par-
ties); Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 358-59 (noting that cases longest on the docket in-
volved represented parties).  The lighter burden that pro se suits impose upon courts 
in comparison to counseled suits reflects not only pro se litigants’ unfamiliarity with 
available litigation tactics but also the less complex nature of the claims that pro se liti-
gants pursue.  Accordingly, pro se suits are particularly good candidates for the sort of 
limited, court-supervised discovery that many commentators and the Iqbal minority 
have suggested as more appropriate than stringent pleading requirements.  See Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961-62 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] trial court, 
responsible for managing a case, . . . can structure discovery . . . . Neither the briefs nor 
the Court’s opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these alternative case-
management tools inadequate . . . .” (citation omitted)); A. Benjamin Spencer, Under-
standing Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 (2009) (“[A] better approach might 
be to permit judges to identify those cases where additional facts are needed to sup-
port the needed inference and reserve judgment on the motion to dismiss until after 
limited, focused discovery on that issue can occur.”).  The discovery costs would not be 
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lack merit, the perception that pro se suits are more burdensome 
emanates in part from the fact that the time required to evaluate a 
submission drafted by counsel is less than the time required to eva-
luate a document of comparable length and substance drafted by a 
pro se litigant.  However, submissions drafted by counsel are typically 
longer and greater in number than those drafted by pro se litigants,58 
thereby negating much of the perceived inefficiency on a case-by-case 
basis.  Thus, pro se litigants do not overwhelmingly inhibit efficient 
court practice more than others, but the belief that they do certainly 
heightens the likelihood that their suits are improperly dismissed. 
In addition, pro se litigants often lack a sufficient understanding of 
procedural and substantive law to initiate a lawsuit properly.59  Proce-
dural deficiencies, such as failure to file on time, are less problematic 
when evaluating the effectiveness of the leeway given pro se litigants 
because special treatment on procedural requirements has been, for 
the most part, emphatically denied.60  As to substantive matters, howev-
er, the knowledge differential is precisely the reason for affording pro 
se litigants special deference at the pleading stage of litigation.  First, 
 
crushing and would most likely be less than the costs in time and effort to courts eva-
luating pro se complaints, which are significant in light of the accommodations to which 
they are entitled.  See Buxton, supra note 31, at 117 (acknowledging the “extensive time 
and effort already expended by court clerks and . . . judges in assisting pro se litigants”). 
58 See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 359 (noting that “counseled cases general-
ly consisted of 50% more docket entries than non-counseled cases”). 
59 See VanWormer, supra note 20, at 993 (“[T]he self-represented ‘are more likely 
to . . . have problems understanding and applying the procedural and substantive 
law pertaining to their claim’ in the initial stages of litigation.” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Buxton, supra note 31, at 114)). 
60 See, e.g., Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc., 342 F.3d 44, 49 n.4 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(“[P]ro se status did not absolve [plaintiff] of the need to comply with . . . the district 
court’s procedural rules.”); Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 549 (10th Cir. 
2000) (“Although pro se litigants get the benefit of more generous treatment in some 
respects, they must nonetheless follow the same rules of procedure that govern other 
litigants.” (citation omitted)); Edwards v. INS, 59 F.3d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[P]ro se liti-
gants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to 
comply with them.”).  The distinction between treatment of procedural and substan-
tive deficiencies is not hard and fast.  A small subset of federal courts have  
rel[ied] upon the Supreme Court’s rationale in Haines v. Kerner to fashion a 
relaxed set of pro se standards for procedural conformity, particularly when deal-
ing with summary judgment proceedings, compliance with discovery rules, the 
imposition of sanctions, and the introduction of evidence.  A greater number of 
courts, however, take a more traditional approach and extend . . . pleading le-
niency only to the substantive issues raised, while continuing to strictly enforce 
compliance with procedural requirements by pro se litigants. 
Buxton, supra note 31, at 118 (footnotes omitted). 
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many pro se litigants have difficulty clearly conveying allegations in a 
complaint due to their lack of legal-writing training.61  Thus, even if the 
conduct from which a grievance arose satisfies each element of a claim, 
illogical or unclear submissions could still result in dismissal.62  Similar-
ly, a mistaken or incomplete understanding of the law can result in a 
pro se litigant pleading the wrong cause of action or, alternatively, not 
pleading an available one.63 
Furthermore, individuals choosing to proceed pro se because they 
cannot afford legal counsel will often lack the resources to uncover 
facts prior to filing their complaints.64  Consequently, these complaints 
will frequently be thin on details and therefore require that courts 
draw more inferences in evaluating motions to dismiss.  In fact, even 
those who have resources are likely to rely upon standardized forms in 
drafting complaints and treat them as exemplary pleadings, which is 
precisely why they are appended to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.65  Those who do will inevitably conclude that a complaint should 
be light on facts and will forego prefiling discovery to support their 
allegations.66  These conclusions could very well have proven fatal to 
complaints under not only the plausibility standard but even under 
the earlier Conley standard as implemented by certain district courts.67 
Accordingly, nonrobust liberal construction may prevent recogni-
tion of meritorious claims by not accounting for the unique challenges 
 
61 See Nichols, supra note 49, at 351 (acknowledging that some pro se litigants draft 
illogical and rambling pleadings that are difficult to decipher). 
62 See Wayne T. Westling & Patricia Rasmussen, Prisoners’ Access to the Courts:  Legal 
Requirements and Practical Realities, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 273, 309 (1985) (emphasizing 
that poor presentation can lose a case with merit). 
63 See Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 659, 678 (1988) (noting that flexible construction of pro se pleadings is 
meant to combat dismissal where a cause of action exists but the complaint fails to say 
the “magic words”).  
64 See Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant:  An Inside 
View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 203-04 (1972) (noting 
that pro se plaintiffs are “almost totally unaware of the . . . value and techniques of pre-
trial discovery and investigation”). 
65 See VanWormer, supra note 20, at 992 (listing the availability of legal forms as 
one of the factors responsible for pro se litigants’ belief that they can successfully pros-
ecute their cases without representation). 
66 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (demonstrating the brief and general elements 
that must be included in a complaint alleging negligence); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 576 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the “bare allegation[s]” 
included in Form 9 of the Federal Rules). 
67 See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing district courts’ tendency 
to stray from the liberal pleading regime established under Conley). 
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that pro se litigants face.  Therefore, liberal construction must be eva-
luated as actually practiced by courts to determine whether it effective-
ly overcomes the barriers between pro se litigants and court access. 
C.  Liberal Construction 
In recognition of the abnormally high potential for meritorious 
pro se complaints to be dismissed, the Supreme Court relaxed plead-
ing standards for pro se litigants to ensure that they receive their “day 
in court.”68  In Haines v. Kerner, the Court held that judges should lib-
erally construe pro se pleadings.69  It further stated that 
allegations such as those asserted by [the pro se] petitioner, however in-
artfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer sup-
porting evidence.  We cannot say with assurance that under the allega-
tions of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears “beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would 
entitle him to relief.”
70
 
Despite consistently affirming its holding, though, the Court has failed 
to flesh out precisely how relaxed a standard lower courts should ap-
ply.71  Consequently, district courts apply different degrees of relaxa-
tion, thereby rendering pleading leniency less reliable at preventing 
dismissal of pro se complaints.72  Nevertheless, one can discern some 
unifying principles, both specific and general, from the jurisprudence 
concerning pro se pleadings. 
 
68 See Edward M. Holt, How to Treat “Fools”:  Exploring the Duties Owed to Pro Se Liti-
gants in Civil Cases, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 167, 168-69 (2001) (asserting that the Supreme 
Court responded to the potential for unfair dismissal of pro se cases by requiring 
judges to liberally construe pro se litigants’ complaints). 
69 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam).  The Court has reaffirmed the le-
nient standard in cases following its initial pronouncement in Haines.  See, e.g., Fed. 
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1158 (2008) (“Even in the formal litiga-
tion context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.”); 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“The handwritten pro se document is to be 
liberally construed.”). 
70 Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). 
71 See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 29 (asserting that the Court “did not 
define the degree of relaxation” applicable to pro se complaints). 
72 See id. at 29-30 (“Not surprisingly, federal courts take varying approaches re-
garding ‘how liberal’ the construction of pro se pleadings should be.”); Douglas A. 
Blaze, Presumed Frivolous:  Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Liti-
gation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 971-72 (1990) (concluding that lower courts have 
frequently ignored or given only “superficial acknowledgment” to the requirement 
that pro se pleadings be liberally construed). 
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1.  The Method by Which Courts Liberally Construe 
Pro Se Complaints  
It is difficult to survey all of the ways by which lower courts opera-
tionalize liberal construction because of the vague terms in which the 
Supreme Court articulated its directive.73  Nevertheless, two general 
lower court techniques are clear:  (1) disregard as much as possible 
pro se litigants’ use of incomprehensible language and incorrect 
grammar in setting forth allegations and (2) intuit from their allega-
tions the appropriate legal claims or procedural devices that pro se li-
tigants would have expressly invoked had they been counseled.74  
However, there are obvious limits upon the extent to which courts will 
 
73 Indeed, lower court opinions often give only cursory mention of the method by 
which they implement liberal construction in a “standard of review” section without 
specific explanation of how it is given effect when particular allegations are evaluated.  
See, e.g., Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 759-60 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (acknowl-
edging the liberal construction afforded a pro se complaint in its “standard of review” 
section, but failing to make further mention of the doctrine in discussion, despite con-
cluding that many of the asserted claims should be dismissed). 
74 See, e.g., Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (describing liber-
al construction as requiring the court to read the pleadings to state a valid claim if rea-
sonable, despite, among other things, a pro se litigant’s “confusion of various legal 
theories” and “poor syntax and sentence construction”).  That both of these conces-
sions would be misguided and unfair to the opposition if a pro se complaint were 
drafted with the aid of counsel—albeit undisclosed—explains courts’ strong disap-
proval of the practice that has come to be known as “ghostwriting.”  See, e.g., Delso v. 
Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Emps. of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 
766349, at *16-17 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (concluding that a lawyer’s informal assistance 
to a pro se litigant in drafting a court document violated the lawyer’s ethical obliga-
tions because it provided the litigant undue advantage in light of the leeway afforded 
pro se litigants).  Permitting limited-scope representations, or “unbundled” legal ser-
vices, is one oft-suggested way to deal with the undue advantage gained when lawyers 
assist in drafting documents submitted pro se without disclosing their participation to 
the court.  See, e.g., Michael W. Loudenslager, Giving Up the Ghost:  A Proposal for Dealing 
with Attorney “Ghostwriting” of Pro Se Litigants’ Court Documents Through Explicit Rules Re-
quiring Disclosure and Allowing Limited Appearance for Such Attorneys, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 
103, 105 (2008).  Allowing limited assistance in this fashion could curtail the extra ef-
fort demanded of courts when considering pro se complaints drafted with the assis-
tance of counsel because the complaints would be less difficult to decipher.  It would 
also thereby allay concerns over less meritorious complaints surviving motions to dis-
miss merely because of the leeway afforded to them.  See Jeffrey P. Justman, Note, Cap-
turing the Ghost:  Expanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to Solve Procedural Concerns 
with Ghostwriting, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1246, 1287 (2008) (recommending an amendment 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 that would allow for limited-scope representation 
and suggesting that such an amendment would make representation more accessible 
to pro se litigants). 
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liberally construe pro se complaints—one of which is the dilution of 
factual allegations needed to state a claim.75 
Disparity in the writing capabilities of pro se litigants and 
represented parties can lead to different rulings on motions to dismiss 
even when the plaintiffs’ grievances arise from identical factual cir-
cumstances.76  This is because the style in which allegations are pre-
sented affects their clarity, which, in turn, influences whether judges 
can discern cognizable legal claims from them.  A complaint drafted 
by a lawyer will likely set forth in neutral language the necessary alle-
gations to state a claim effectively—time, place, specific sequence of 
events—and end with a prayer for relief.  By contrast, if the complaint 
is drafted without assistance of counsel, it will likely be tainted by emo-
tional language, legal jargon, tangents, and less direct or incompre-
hensible assertions of fact.77  Accordingly, courts attempt to mitigate 
the impact that pro se litigants’ “inartful” drafting may have on the 
adequacy of their complaints with the first form of liberal construc-
tion:  to the extent possible, pro se allegations should be read only for 
substance, disregarding poor style, vocabulary, syntax, superfluities, 
and the like.78  Courts, then, must discern from the allegations the fac-
tual scenario that the plaintiff intended to allege.79 
A complaint that references laws under which the allegations pro-
vide no relief may also be subject to dismissal.  Presumably, such dismis-
 
75 See, e.g., Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 (noting that liberal construction does not pre-
vent pro se litigants from having to allege sufficient facts to state a claim). 
76 See Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 62, at 309 (“There is no doubt that a good 
case can be lost by poor presentation. . . . Even an otherwise meritorious claim can be-
come lost in a tangle of facts, extraneous material, unsupported assertions, and fallacious 
arguments.”); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 64, at 181-82 (acknowledging the negative 
effect that pro se litigants’ “inability to communicate effectively in writing” can have on 
their complaints, often leading to dismissal for being “rambling and conclusory”). 
77 See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 64, at 182 n.91 (discussing the “emotional 
distortions” in many pro se pleadings, as well as their tendency to “slip into an imita-
tion of legal jargon copied from other sources”). 
For example, a civil rights complaint . . . may begin in flamboyant, legal-
sounding rhetoric with a series of broad generalizations about civil and hu-
man rights.  At some point the complainant may state conclusorily that he was 
“brutally beaten by the guard” and then, with renewed vigor, launch into fren-
zied attacks on prison conditions in general. 
Id. at 182. 
78 See, e.g., Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 (listing “poor syntax and sentence construction” as 
two flaws that should be overlooked in evaluating the sufficiency of pro se complaints). 
79 See, e.g., Ayres v. Ellis, No. 09-4247, 2009 WL 3681892, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 
2009) (quoting a pro se complaint’s unclear factual averments and extracting from 
them the facts that the pro se litigant “meant to allege”). 
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sal is proper when a reasonably competent lawyer drafts the complaint 
because the lawyer would have invoked a different law had one been 
more advantageous to the client’s case.  However, that same presump-
tion is less tenable with respect to complaints drafted by pro se litigants 
because of the challenges faced by laypersons in comprehending legal 
doctrines and recognizing available legal theories upon which to base 
claims.  Acknowledging that pro se litigants frequently have a flawed or 
incomplete understanding of the law, courts have supplemented their 
disregard for stylistic deficiencies with a more “activist” form of liberal 
construction:  to the extent possible, courts should restructure a com-
plaint to invoke the most appropriate legal bases suggested by the alle-
gations.80  For example, one plaintiff who asserted that the parole 
commission’s disregard of its own process regulations was unfair had 
his complaint interpreted as a procedural due process claim.81  Thus, 
courts may construe a complaint to invoke the substantive law under 
which the allegations have the best chance of stating a claim, even if 
the plaintiff has asserted violations under an inapplicable law or failed 
to expressly assert any particular legal claim whatsoever.82 
Beyond simply targeting challenges pro se litigants face, the two 
techniques by which courts liberally construe pro se complaints seek 
to extract what the litigants would have presented had they retained 
 
80 See, e.g., Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2002) (construing 
a pro se complaint to make the best arguments that the allegations suggest); Franklin 
v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) (providing a pro se petition for habeas corpus 
an “active interpretation” to “encompass any allegation stating federal relief” (quoting 
White v. Wyrick, 530 F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam))). 
81 See Lee v. Rios, No. 08-5330, 2010 WL 22328, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2010) 
(“Thus, this Court should construe his argument that he was ‘deprived . . . of the funda-
mental fairness in the parole voting process’ as an assertion that the Commission violated 
his right to procedural due process.” (omission in original) (citation omitted)). 
82 See, e.g., Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 713 (6th Cir. 2004) (construing a civil 
rights claim to be instead a habeas petition because that was the only viable claim 
based upon the allegations set forth in the complaint).  Judge Bacharach and Professor 
Entzeroth take issue with the judicial practice of reading into pro se complaints claims 
“fairly [but perhaps not explicitly] raised.”  Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 32-
41.  To illustrate the flaws in such an approach, they point to how it conflicts with the 
statutory schemes created by the PLRA and AEDPA.  Id. at 35-41.  For example, if a 
judge reads into a pro se complaint a claim as to which the plaintiff did not exhaust 
administrative remedies, the practice may lead to dismissal of the entire action under 
the PLRA.  Id. at 34.  In addition, if a judge construes a civil rights complaint as a ha-
beas petition that ultimately fails, the pro se litigant then faces nearly insurmountable 
hurdles under AEDPA to filing a successive petition for habeas relief.  Id. at 37.  To the 
authors, these pitfalls suggest that activist approaches toward pro se litigants should be 
constrained because they often punish intended beneficiaries.  See id. at 41 (“With this 
intangible loss of a judge’s neutrality, the courts may be creating unintended penalties 
for the litigants who the courts are paradoxically trying to help.”).     
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counsel.83  However, the Supreme Court has never stated that these 
techniques are correct.  Indeed, the language with which it articu-
lated the leniency afforded to pro se pleadings hints at an alterna-
tive—albeit significantly broader—theory behind liberal construc-
tion.  Just what that theory is, and whether it is viable, is the topic of 
the following subsection. 
2.  The Theory Behind Liberal Construction  
Despite its failure to expressly set forth a coherent theory pur-
suant to which lower courts should liberally construe pro se com-
plaints, the Supreme Court has provided them a modicum of guid-
ance on the general meaning of liberal construction.  The best 
description one can discern is that liberal construction is simply an 
exaggerated version of the Conley “no set of facts” standard.84  In fact, 
each pronouncement of the relaxed pleading standard is accompa-
nied by the Conley Court’s instruction not to dismiss a claim unless it is 
“beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would 
entitle him to relief.”85  Justice Scalia confirmed this understanding 
when he asserted that “[l]iberal construction of pro se pleadings is 
merely an embellishment of the notice-pleading standard set forth in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”86 
As an exaggerated form of transsubstantive notice pleading,87 
then, liberal construction’s efficacy as a less stringent standard largely 
depends upon lower courts’ adherence to a simplified pleading re-
gime.  At least in theory, because plaintiffs could easily surpass the 
 
83 See id. at 43-44 (suggesting that a pro se litigant’s intent should be the hallmark 
of the leeway granted her complaint). 
84 See Bradlow, supra note 63, at 681-82 (discussing development of the Haines ap-
proach in relation to Conley and concluding that the “ultimate result is a less stringent 
interpretation of what is itself a very lax standard”); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 
41, 45-46 (1957) (articulating the “no set of facts” standard). 
85 See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980) (per curiam) (observing that 
“it is settled law that the allegations of [a pro se] complaint . . . are held to ‘less strin-
gent standards’” and noting that such complaints “should not be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam))). 
86 Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment). 
87 See Fairman, supra note 9, at 988 (describing notice pleading as a touchstone of 
the Federal Rules, merely requiring that a “plaintiff provide a short and plain state-
ment of a claim sufficient to put the defendant on notice” in order to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss).  
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threshold to discovery, the Court appears to have believed liberal 
construction did not need to take such a robust form.  Lower courts 
followed the Supreme Court’s lead by focusing less on liberalizing 
the actual standard of sufficiency and more on mitigating the effect 
of pro se litigants’ reduced capacity to draft understandable and le-
gally accurate complaints.88  However, pre-Twombly, those lower courts 
demonstrated a propensity to stray from the liberal standard the draf-
ters of the Federal Rules envisioned.89  Most significantly, district 
courts deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions appropriated the ability to 
parse a complaint’s factual allegations into “conclusory” averments 
that should be disregarded and other statements entitled to consid-
eration as true.90  Additionally, courts often insisted that plaintiffs 
plead facts in support of their claims in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss.91  That these devices ran contrary to notice pleading is dem-
onstrated by the Supreme Court’s consistent reversal of lower court 
decisions displaying their use.92 
 
88 See supra subsection I.C.1 (discussing the ways by which lower courts implement 
liberal construction in practice). 
89 See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 567-68 (noting that lower courts often disre-
garded the Supreme Court’s explicit instructions to apply lenient notice pleading 
standards, instead insisting on heightened pleading requirements, particularly in 
civil rights cases). 
90 See Marcus, supra note 13, at 466-71 (discussing courts’ tendency to label some 
factual allegations conclusory and thereby require more supporting evidence for them 
to be sufficient).  
91 See Fairman, supra note 9, at 1011-59 (documenting lower courts’ insistence that 
complaints contain greater factual specificity in various fields of law, including anti-
trust, environmental, and civil rights). 
92 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (reversing a 
lower court ruling that employment discrimination complaints must allege “specific 
facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination” and holding that they must only 
present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief” (citation omitted)).  Notably, however, the Court’s recent rulings in Twombly 
and Iqbal have called the continuing vitality of Swierkiewicz into question.  See, e.g., Fow-
ler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have to con-
clude . . . that because Conley has been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and Iq-
bal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns pleading requirements and 
relies on Conley.”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion:  The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) (declaring 
that, as a result of the similarities between the new motion to dismiss and the motion 
for summary judgment, Swierkiewicz “effectively may be dead”).  Nevertheless, in nei-
ther case did the Supreme Court specifically overturn its decision in Swierkiewicz.  See 
Thomas, supra, at 36 (acknowledging that “Iqbal and Twombly did not expressly over-
rule Swierkiewicz”).  In fact, the Court cited it approvingly in Twombly, which together 
with other commonalities between the two cases—among them, endorsement of a fair-
notice principle in Rule 8(a)—suggest that Swierkiewicz is still good law.  Compare Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (asserting that Rule 8(a)(2) only re-
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Thus, lacking a cohesive articulation of a more liberal standard by 
which to judge the sufficiency of pro se allegations—and ostensibly re-
lying upon generally liberal pleading to ensure its efficacy—liberal 
construction did not compensate for the historical end run around 
notice pleading.93  And certainly, the challenges confronting pro se 
litigants could only have exacerbated their vulnerability to the devices 
lower courts used to dismiss more complaints, despite judicial efforts 
to overlook them.94  Approximately sixty-seven percent of pro se com-
plaints were dismissed under Conley,95 clear evidence of this reality.  
These statistics show that the mantra “dismissal of a pro se claim as in-
sufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the most unsustainable of 
cases”96 may be mere lip service. 
This reality, though, has been significantly altered by the sea 
change in pleading practice inspired by Twombly and Iqbal.  Since the 
decisions retired Conley’s “no set of facts” standard,97 upon which lib-
eral construction relied, the practice too may have earned its retire-
ment.  As the following discussion shows, Conley provided a superior—
albeit flawed—background standard for liberal construction to pro-
tect pro se litigants as compared to the new plausibility standard. 
 
quires “a short and plain statement” to “give the defendant fair notice of what 
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (citation omitted)), with Swierkie-
wicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (noting that the complaint satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a) 
because it gives fair notice to the defendant). 
93 See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of 
Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 443 (1993) (concluding from a review of reported dis-
trict court and court of appeals decisions that many courts have applied stringent 
pleading standards to pro se complaints). 
94 See Section II.B for a more in-depth explanation of how the conflagration of 
challenges facing pro se litigants post-Iqbal renders liberal construction an ineffective 
bulwark against improper dismissals for failure to state a claim. 
95 Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 615. 
96 Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added).  Interes-
tingly, the complaint in Boykin was quite similar to the one dismissed in Iqbal.  In Boy-
kin, an African American woman alleged that a lender denied her home-equity loan 
application on account of her race, sex, and neighborhood.  Id. at 206.  In her com-
plaint, she did not state specific factual allegations to support the claim of discrimina-
tory motive, instead alleging it generally based upon “information and belief.”  Id. at 
214 (citation omitted).  The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, noting that the general averment was sufficient for Rule 8(a) 
purposes.  Id. at 215.  Whether the same decision would have resulted after Iqbal is un-
clear; however, the court’s strong emphasis on the leeway granted pro se complaints, 
even under Twombly, lends hope for more robust liberal construction of the sort pro-
posed herein.  
97 See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 (holding that the “no set of facts” standard 
has earned its retirement and “is best forgotten”). 
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II.  PLAUSIBILITY AND PRO SE PLEADINGS 
In Twombly, the Supreme Court announced the new plausibility 
standard by which pleadings are to be judged:  a complaint must al-
lege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”98  A facially plausible complaint is one that “raise[s] a reasona-
ble expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the alleged 
wrongdoing.99  However, despite affirming the Twombly decision, Iqbal 
substantially bolstered plausibility as a device by which lower courts 
can dismiss weak, not just meritless, cases.100  Iqbal is the focus of the 
 
98 Id. at 570.  For an interesting account of the origins of plausibility, see Edward 
Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”:  An Introduction to the Symposium 
on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3-9 (2010).  Professor Brunet traces 
the origins of the word “plausible” to antitrust litigation, in which the Court used the 
term substantively to evaluate whether a conspiracy claim made “economic sense.”  Id. 
at 4.  According to him, “[b]ecause of the prior substantive use of plausibility it seems 
highly questionable to re-use this term as a new procedural standard for assessing Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. . . . Plausibility as a standard to test pleadings seems con-
fused and should be scrapped.”  Id. at 14. 
99 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
100 See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised:  A Comment on Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 852 (2010) (“Iqbal applies a thick screening 
model that aims to screen weak as well as meritless suits, whereas Twombly applies a 
thin screening model that aims to screen only truly meritless suits.”).  This is certainly 
not the only significant change brought about by the Court’s decision in Iqbal.  In addi-
tion to its ruling with respect to pleading standards, the Iqbal Court eliminated the pos-
sibility of supervisory liability in Bivens claims, which are made against federal officials 
for constitutional violations.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (refut-
ing the petitioner’s contention that officials can be made liable under Bivens pursuant 
to a theory of supervisory liability and holding that “each Government official . . . is 
only liable for his or her own misconduct”); see also generally Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (providing a private 
remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendmet by federal agents).  This will no doubt 
cause shockwaves in lower courts, which, prior to Iqbal, acknowledged forms of supervi-
sory liability in Bivens actions, despite the well-established precedent that such claims 
cannot be based upon respondeat superior.  See, e.g., Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 
995 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing the standard for supervisory liability in a Bivens ac-
tion); Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that in 
Bivens actions, supervisory liability exists only when “there is subordinate liability” and 
“the supervisor’s action or inaction was affirmatively linked to the constitutional viola-
tion caused by the subordinate” (quoting Aponte Matos v. Toledo-Dávila, 135 F.3d 182, 
192 (1st Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); White v. Downs, No. 95-2177, 
1997 WL 210858, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 1997) (per curiam) (“Although there is no 
respondeat superior liability in Bivens actions, a supervisor c[an] be held liable for the acts 
of a subordinate . . . .” (citations omitted)).  Whether the Court should even have de-
cided the issue is questionable because both parties agreed on the availability of super-
visory liability and the standard pursuant to which it should be judged, such that the 
question was not presented to the Court.  See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1956-58 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the majority “sua sponte decide[d] the scope of supervisory 
liability” despite the parties’ agreement on the issue).  The absence of full briefing and 
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inquiry here because the Court’s two-pronged approach to plausibility 
analysis systematically exploits pro se litigants’ vulnerabilities to dis-
miss their seemingly weak suits. 
A.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
1.  Background and Prior History 
Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, federal authori-
ties arrested and detained Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani citizen.101  After 
pleading guilty to charges of fraud in connection with identification 
documents, Iqbal was released from detention and subsequently re-
moved to Pakistan.102  In May 2004, he commenced a suit in the East-
ern District of New York against numerous federal officials, including 
former Attorney General John Ashcroft and current FBI Director Ro-
bert Mueller.103 
Iqbal’s complaint concerned his seven-month confinement under 
highly restrictive conditions.104  Iqbal alleged that federal authorities 
designated him a person “of high interest on account of his race, reli-
gion, or national origin” in violation of the First and Fifth Amend-
ments.105  Specifically, he alleged that the FBI, under Mueller’s direc-
tion, arrested and detained “‘thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as 
part of its investigation of the events of September 11.’”106  He further 
alleged that, in discussions with Mueller, Ashcroft authorized a “policy 
of holding post–September 11th detainees in highly restrictive condi-
tions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI.”107  Last, Iqbal 
averred that Mueller and Ashcroft “each knew of, condoned, and will-
fully and maliciously agreed to subject” him and others to harsh condi-
 
argument on the Bivens issue may undercut the precedential effect of the Court’s eli-
mination of supervisory liability.  See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRAC-
TICE 305 & n.94 (9th ed. 2007) (noting that “decisions explained in a written opinion 
but rendered without full briefing and argument” are not entitled to as much weight as 
decisions that are “fully articulated”). 
101 See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147-49 (2d Cir. 2007) (recounting Iqbal’s arrest 
by the FBI and INS, as well as his subsequent detention in the Metropolitan Detention 
Center), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
102 See Burbank, supra note 16, at 114 (detailing the facts preceding Iqbal’s com-
plaint, including a guilty plea leading to his removal to Pakistan). 
103 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 149; Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-01809, 2005 WL 2375202, 
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). 
104 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943-44. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal’s complaint). 
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tions “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [their] religion, race, 
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.”108 
Mueller and Ashcroft moved to dismiss the allegations against 
them for failure to state a claim.109  Pre-Twombly, the district court de-
nied their motion, invoking the Conley standard to assert that, accept-
ing the allegations as true, it could not conclude that there was no set 
of facts that would entitle Iqbal to relief against Mueller and Ash-
croft.110  The defendants then pursued an interlocutory appeal in the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the district 
court’s denial of the motion to dismiss in light of Twombly, decided 
just several months prior.111 
The Second Circuit held that Iqbal’s allegations against Ashcroft 
and Mueller satisfied the plausibility standard.112  It interpreted Twom-
bly as instituting “a flexible ‘plausibility standard’” that only demands 
further factual support for claims where the context alone does not 
render inferences of wrongdoing plausible.113  According to Judge 
Newman, no additional factual “amplification” was needed to render 
Iqbal’s claims against Ashcroft and Mueller plausible.114  The allegation 
that the defendants condoned and agreed to the discrimination was 
plausible “because of the likelihood that these senior officials would 
have concerned themselves with the formulation and implementation 
of policies dealing with the confinement of those arrested . . . and des-
ignated ‘of high interest’ in the aftermath of 9/11.”115 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Two-Pronged Approach 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision on the 
claims of discrimination against Ashcroft and Mueller in a five-to-four 
 
108 Id. 
109 Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-01809, 2005 WL 2375202, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 27, 2005). 
110 Id. at *29. 
111 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942 (describing the procedural history in the lower courts). 
112 See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 177 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Applying the normal 
pleading rules . . . , even as supplemented by the plausibility standard, we have no 
doubt that the Plaintiff’s allegations . . . suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss.”), 
rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
113 See id. at 157-58 (emphasizing that a pleader need only “amplify a claim with 
some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to rend-
er the claim plausible”). 
114 See id. at 166 (“Plaintiff’s allegations . . . are entirely plausible, without allega-
tions of additional subsidiary facts.”). 
115 Id. at 175-76. 
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decision.116  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that Iqbal’s 
complaint failed to adequately allege a plausible claim that the high-
ranking officials acted for the purpose of discriminating on account of 
race, religion, or national origin.117  The two-step process by which the 
majority arrived at that conclusion, however, vastly expanded Twombly 
beyond what its author, Justice Souter, intended.118 
First, the Court instructed lower courts considering a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to ignore allegations that are, in fact, conclusions 
and therefore not entitled to a presumption of truth.119  Despite attri-
buting this maneuver to Iqbal’s plausibility predecessor, Twombly, Jus-
tice Kennedy extended its scope to include not only “legal conclu-
sions” but also “threadbare” or “bald” factual allegations.120  Thus, 
even factual averments or mixed statements of law and fact can be 
ignored in determining a complaint’s plausibility if a judge deems 
them deficient of adequate specificity.121  Additionally, the Court eva-
 
116 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954. 
117 See id. at 1952 (holding that the complaint did not contain facts plausibly show-
ing the petitioners’ purposeful adoption of a discriminatory policy). 
118 See id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The majority then misapplies the 
pleading standard under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly to conclude that the complaint 
fails to state a claim.” (citation omitted)); see also Burbank, supra note 16, at 115 
(commenting that Iqbal’s “mischief” is likely a “major source of regret for the author 
of the Twombly decision”). 
119 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (majority opinion) (asserting that a court need not 
accept as true “mere conclusory statements”).  Notably, the Court did not outright 
“cast aside the assumption-of-truth rule, which holds that a claimant’s factual allega-
tions are entitled to be believed and accepted at the pleading stage.”  A. Benjamin 
Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 
192 (2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).  However, the 
Court’s treatment of the allegations in Iqbal’s complaint does question the rule’s vitali-
ty going forward.  Id.  Indeed, one commentator has characterized the plausibility in-
quiry as secondary to the first step at which certain allegations are ignored.  See Adam 
N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1314 (2010) (asserting that 
the “‘plausibility’ inquiry is not in fact the primary inquiry at the pleadings phase” and 
suggesting that it “becomes irrelevant if a plaintiff provides nonconclusory allegations 
for each element of a claim for relief”).    
120 Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007) (concluding that 
the complaint’s “stray” allegations of illegal “agreement” were “merely legal conclu-
sions”), with Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (dismissing repondent’s allegations regarding pe-
titioners’ knowledge as “bare” and “conclusory”). 
121 See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, Pro-
fessor, University of Pennsylvania Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4189 (under “Witness Testimony”) (noting that the Court 
claimed the power to “carve a complaint” by ignoring some allegations of fact and 
mixed allegations of law and fact as conclusory); Bone, supra note 100, at 860-61 (con-
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luated each allegation in the complaint individually to determine if 
they were specific enough to warrant a presumption of truth.122  
Again, this disregarded Justice Souter’s consideration of the Twombly 
complaint as a whole before concluding that its “general allegations 
of agreement were intended to be [legal] conclusions based on paral-
lel conduct alleged elsewhere.”123 
Once a court has “weeded out” the allegations that can be ignored 
for the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss,124 it is instructed to 
determine if the remaining factual allegations “plausibly suggest an 
entitlement to relief.”125  “[J]udicial experience and common sense” 
act as guides in considering whether, in light of competing inferences 
that can be drawn from the allegations, the plaintiff’s theory of 
wrongdoing is plausible.126  Although this step in the analysis largely 
parallels the approach in Twombly, there is a significant difference 
that bears highlighting:  courts have extensive experience with gener-
ic antitrust suits, but not claims of the sort put forth by Javaid Iqbal.127  
 
cluding that the Iqbal Court’s approach to differentiating between conclusory and 
nonconclusory facts is based upon the level of generality at which they are stated).   
122 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (dismissing allegations as conclusory without discus-
sion of other allegations to which they are related); see also Rakesh N. Kilaru, Com-
ment, The New Rule 12(b)(6):  Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 905, 913 (2010) (“To Justice Kennedy, each allegation must stand or fall on its 
own . . . .”). 
123 Bone, supra note 100, at 859; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting that singling out certain allegations from a complaint as a whole is a 
“fallacy” inhering in the majority’s approach). 
124 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (majority opinion). 
125 Id. at 1951. 
126 Id. at 1950; see also Burbank, supra note 16, at 118 (characterizing the Court’s 
analysis as a necessarily comparative one in which judges imagine, based on their pre-
dispositions, other possible explanations for the allegations included in a complaint).  
In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts are confined to reviewing facts in the com-
plaint, documents referred to therein, and facts of which judicial notice is taken.  See 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (“[C]ourts must 
consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily ex-
amine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents in-
corporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take 
judicial notice.”).  Thus, courts’ consideration of competing inferences made from 
neither the plaintiff’s pleadings nor the defendant’s responses thereto—considered 
sua sponte, if you will—suggests that their analysis may extend beyond the proper 
scope of a Rule 12(b)(6) determination. 
127 See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?, supra note 121, at 12 
(“Twombly involved assessing competing inferences in a well-trodden path of antitrust 
law, [but] in Iqbal the Court was at sea, subjecting the competing inferences, most of 
which were left to the [J]ustices’ imaginations, to an implicit comparative exercise.”); 
see also Bone, supra note 100, at 877 (characterizing Iqbal’s story as “unusual enough to 
suggest something fishy might be going on”). 
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This results in greater reliance upon values than experience, despite 
the latter being perhaps more prudent.  If a judge finds an opposing 
inference of lawful conduct by a defendant significantly more plausi-
ble, she should dismiss the claim.128 
The Court proceeded to apply its novel two-pronged approach to 
Iqbal’s allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller.129  The Court ex-
cluded several critical averments included in the complaint, the most 
notable of which alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, con-
doned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to harsh 
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of 
[his] religion, race, and/or national origin.”130  Thus, the Court con-
sidered only allegations asserting (1) that the pair agreed on the poli-
cy of restrictively detaining 9/11 suspects and (2) that the FBI imple-
mented the policy under Mueller’s direction.  These, according to the 
Court, failed to “nudge” the claim of discriminatory purpose from 
“conceivable to plausible.”131  Competing inferences of lawful intent 
rendered the alternative pressed by Iqbal implausible; defendants, in 
other words, more likely sought to keep Iqbal in secure conditions be-
cause he was a suspected terrorist, not because of his Pakistani origin.132 
B.  Iqbal’s Impact on Pro Se Pleadings 
The Supreme Court drastically altered federal pleading practice 
by supplanting Conley’s low-threshold, “no set of facts” standard with 
 
128 See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (concluding that, given more likely and ob-
vious explanations for defendants’ conduct, the allegations failed to raise a plausible 
inference of wrongdoing). 
129 Professor Spencer’s analysis of the Court’s treatment of Iqbal’s supposedly 
“conclusory” allegations suggests that the plausibility inquiry does not even involve two 
distinct steps: 
At bottom . . . the Court’s rejection of certain factual allegations as “too con-
clusory” is really a statement that (1) the allegations are factual claims that as-
sert the unexpected, particularly about certain kinds of defendants . . . ; (2) as 
such, the allegations require additional supporting facts to be believed; and 
(3) such facts are lacking in the claimant’s statement of his claim. 
Spencer, supra note 119, at 196.  However, the initial step in Professor Spencer’s de-
construction of Iqbal’s approach involves a question of believability, or what many 
would term “plausibility.”  
130 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
131 Id. at 1952 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
132 See id. at 1951-52 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567) (emphasizing that a policy of 
targeting suspected terrorists and housing them in a restrictive environment is an 
“obvious alternative explanation,” which only suggests disparate impact and not dis-
criminatory purpose).  
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Iqbal’s new plausibility standard.133  The change demands that the 
Court’s instruction to construe pro se complaints liberally similarly be 
reevaluated, if not concomitantly altered, because it is an elaboration 
of the now-retired standard.134  Thus, the following section considers 
whether in theory liberal construction survives Iqbal, and whether in 
practice it accommodates the resulting change in pleading doctrine to 
protect meritorious pro se complaints from premature dismissal.135 
1.  The Minimal Assurance Provided Pro Se Litigants 
by Erickson v. Pardus 
On the heels of its decision in Twombly, the Supreme Court is-
sued a per curiam opinion in Erickson v. Pardus, which involved a pro 
se complaint.136  Although the Court reemphasized the special solici-
tude granted pro se pleadings—thereby confirming liberal construc-
tion’s survival post-plausibility—the case provides little comfort that 
pro se litigants have adequate access to courts under the new plead-
ing regime.137 
 
133 Herrmann, Beck & Burbank, supra note 4, at 148 (Burbank, Rebuttal) (ar-
guing that, rather than clarifying pleading standards, the recent pleading decisions 
“changed them”). 
134 Unfortunately, commentators have given this relatively glaring development 
only casual, passing consideration.  See, e.g., Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 
29-32 (noting that the new plausibility standard will change the extent to which courts 
liberally evaluate pro se complaints because it increases the subjectivity of the analysis). 
135 Scholars have similarly singled out other types of cases for reevaluation in light 
of Twombly and Iqbal, concluding that the new plausibility standard is so poor a fit for 
such cases that an entirely different standard is necessary.  See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, 
The Trouble with Twombly:  A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1041-50 (proposing a new pleading standard to re-
place plausibility for evaluating employment discrimination complaints).   
136 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).  The acceptance of such an unremarkable 
case and the timing of its decision suggest that the Supreme Court sought to main-
tain, as one critic put it, “deniability”:  the capacity to check excessive usages of plau-
sibility to give the appearance of maintaining a consistent pleading doctrine.  See Edi-
torial, The Devil in the Details, 91 JUDICATURE 52, 54 (2007) (“More probably, Twombly 
is an exercise in strategic ambiguity that empowers the lower federal courts to tighten 
pleading . . . while preserving deniability . . . [by] correct[ing] perceived excesses (as 
in Erickson).”); Amy Howe, More on Yesterday’s Decision in No. 06-7317, Erickson v. Par-
dus, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2007, 5:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/06/ 
more-on-yesterdays-decision-in-no-06-7317-erickson-v-pardus (suggesting that the 
Court’s decision was meant to “counteract the impression” that Twombly heightened 
pleading standards). 
137 Whether plausibility analysis applied at all to pro se pleadings was in question 
in the wake of Erickson.  See, e.g., Anthony Martinez, Case Note, Plausibility Among the 
Circuits:  An Empirical Survey of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 ARK. L. REV. 763, 775 
(2009) (“Erickson implies that the Twombly standard may not be applicable to a com-
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William Erickson, a Colorado inmate, filed a pro se complaint 
against prison officials, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment 
rights.138  Specifically, Erickson, unaided by counsel, averred that 
prison officials had diagnosed him as requiring treatment for hepatitis 
C; that he had been placed in an appropriate treatment program; that 
shortly after the program commenced the prison[] doctor removed him 
from the program in violation of the applicable protocol; that prison of-
ficials refused to recommence his treatment despite his eligibility; and 
that, in the meantime, he was suffering irreversible damage to his liver 
and risking possible death.
139
 
Nonetheless, the district court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss because Erickson failed to allege adequately that the 
doctor’s discontinuance of treatment caused the harm, rather than the 
hepatitis C.140  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed, fur-
ther characterizing the allegations of independent harm as “conclu-
sory” and therefore “insufficient to state a claim.”141  Each court paid 
lip service to the special solicitude afforded pro se pleadings,142 but, 
alas, the leniency did not rescue Erickson’s complaint in either venue. 
The Supreme Court, however, did save the complaint, summarily 
reversing the lower court decisions because Erickson’s allegations 
were not too conclusory to satisfy federal pleading requirements.143  
Despite having decided Twombly just two weeks earlier, though, the 
 
plaint filed by a pro se plaintiff.”).  However, this seems to have been wishful thinking, 
because lower courts overwhelmingly cite the new standard when considering pro se 
complaints.  See, e.g., Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 F. App’x 601, 603 (5th Cir. 
2009) (per curiam) (applying the plausibility standard to a pro se complaint); Gra-
bauskas v. CIA, 354 F. App’x 576, 576-77 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing a pro se complaint 
for failing to raise a plausible inference of wrongdoing). 
138 See Complaint at 3, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (No. 05-0405) (per 
curiam), 2005 WL 5543460 (claiming that prison staff were deliberately indifferent to 
plaintiff’s medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
139 Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2):  Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 
243 F.R.D. 604, 636 (2007) (citing Complaint, supra note 138, at 3).  
140 See Erickson v. Pardus, 198 Fed. App’x 694, 698 (10th Cir. 2006) (recounting 
the basis for the district court’s dismissal of the pro se complaint), vacated, Erickson v. 
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). 
141 See id. (explaining that Erickson’s complaint included only conclusory allega-
tions regarding an independent cognizable harm from the doctors removing him 
from treatment). 
142 See, e.g., id. at 696 (noting that a “pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed 
liberally” but that a court “is not required to assume the role of advocate” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). 
143 See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (concluding that it was error for the Court of Ap-
peals to dismiss the allegations of independent harm as conclusory). 
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Supreme Court made no mention of the plausibility standard.144  In-
stead, the Court emphasized that the allegations satisfied Rule 8(a)(2) 
by giving “the defendant[s] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”145  Notably, the Court did not rely upon 
Erickson’s pro se status to deem his complaint adequate, noting only 
that the departure from established rules of pleading was more pro-
nounced because of the leniency to which that status entitled him.146 
Despite Erickson’s reaffirmation that lower courts must liberally 
construe pro se complaints,147 the decision fails to allay concerns over 
liberal construction’s efficacy post-plausibility.  This is because Erick-
son’s complaint, irrespective of the Court’s failure to so state, satisfied 
Twombly’s version of the plausibility standard.148  Erickson raised a 
plausible inference of independent, cognizable harm by asserting that 
the prison doctor’s deliberate cessation of treatment endangered his 
life.149  The opinion, then, does not demonstrate that an otherwise too 
thinly pleaded complaint could be rendered substantively sufficient by 
liberally construing it since Erickson’s pro se status did not influence 
the decision.150  This shortcoming supports the notion that liberal 
construction only includes a set of devices to deal with challenges 
 
144 See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 573 (“The [Erickson] Court did not even refer to 
the ‘plausibility’ standard . . . .”); Ides, supra note 139, at 639 (noting that the Erickson 
Court only cited Twombly twice for propositions unrelated to plausibility). 
145 Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007)).  Although the Court correctly deemed the complaint sufficient to survive a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it confused the notice-giving requirements of 12(e) with the 
requirements of substantive sufficiency in 12(b)(6).  See Burbank, supra note 16, at 114 
(implying that notice is irrelevant under Rule 12(b)(6) and is properly considered un-
der Rule 12(e)); Ides, supra note 139, at 637-38 (suggesting that a problem inheres in 
the Court’s emphasis on fair notice, rather than substantive sufficiency, which seems to 
undergird its decision).     
146 See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (claiming that the departure from liberal pleading 
standards “is even more pronounced . . . because petitioner has been proceed-
ing . . . without counsel,” but asserting that the allegations were sufficient irrespective 
of plaintiff’s pro se status). 
147 See id. (noting that “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed’” 
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))). 
148 See Editorial, supra note 136, at 54 (asserting that the lower court rulings in 
Erickson were out of line with Twombly).  One could also argue that, by holding the 
complaint sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the Court implicitly acknowledged 
that Erickson met the Twombly standard because the Court espoused the belief that 
Twombly had not changed pleading requirements.  
149 See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (analyzing the complaint’s assertion that the plain-
tiff’s removal from treatment “was endangering” his life). 
150 See id. (concluding that the allegations alone were sufficient to satisfy pleading 
requirements before mentioning liberal construction). 
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identified pre-plausibility and does not account for new issues arising 
after the modern standard’s conception. 
Moreover, the lower courts’ excessive use of the “conclusory” label 
to disregard allegations in Erickson’s pro se complaint foreshadowed 
liberal construction’s inefficacy after Iqbal.151  In Iqbal, the Supreme 
Court lent its imprimatur to such excesses by deeming certain allega-
tions conclusory without offering a principled way by which to distin-
guish them from other acceptable allegations.152  Lower courts, then, 
will predictably increase their disregard, unprincipled as it may be, for 
conclusory averments to dismiss pro se complaints at a disproportio-
nately higher rate than those drafted by counsel.153  Even if the Su-
preme Court is not comfortable with such usages, its limited discre-
tionary docket prevents it from effectively curtailing them.  More 
probably, though, the Court expects these excesses to occur, but 
shirks responsibility for them by deciding cases like Erickson.  Indeed, 
that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit so used the “conclu-
sory” label prior to Iqbal, and with regard to an obviously sufficient 
complaint, presaged the turn for the worse borne out by the statistical 
evidence presented below. 
Therefore, even if the Court accepted Erickson as a means to check 
perceived excesses resulting from Twombly, its per curiam opinion fails 
to breathe enough life into liberal construction to check these ex-
cesses with respect to pro se complaints.  What remains of liberal con-
struction is that courts should disregard unclear drafting and supple-
ment more accurate legal bases than those explicitly invoked in 
determining whether or not pro se complaints suggest plausible en-
titlements to relief.154  Unfortunately, though, this leniency fails to en-
sure that meritorious pro se suits proceed to discovery. 
 
151 See Ides, supra note 139, at 638 (asserting that Erickson demonstrates lower 
courts’ “overly fastidious and inappropriate insistence on the pleading of ‘non-
conclusory’ facts”). 
152 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
majority’s holding that the statements it selects are conclusory cannot be squared with 
its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as nonconclusory.”). 
153 See infra subsections II.B.2-3 (documenting and explaining the disproportio-
nate increase in the dismissal rate of pro se complaints as compared to other com-
plaints post-Iqbal). 
154 See McMahon, supra note 41, at 867-68 (hypothesizing that Erickson simply 
means that the plausibility standard should be less stringently applied to pro se com-
plaints than complaints prepared by counsel).  
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2.  Iqbal’s Exceptional Hostility Toward Pro Se Complaints 
Recent evidence belies initial speculation that the new plausibility 
standard would not significantly increase the overall dismissal rate.155  
In fact, the most current evaluation of federal pleading practice de-
monstrates that the rate of dismissal increased by ten percent between 
Conley and Iqbal, rising from forty-six to fifty-six percent.156  But, an in-
crease in the rate of dismissal by itself would be less troublesome if 
relatively consistent between counseled and pro se litigants.  However, 
initial evidence strongly suggests that the increase has not evenly af-
fected both classes. 
The rate at which pro se complaints are dismissed after Iqbal has 
increased by an even greater extent than the overall rate of dismis-
sal.157  The percentage of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
“granted in all cases brought by pro se plaintiffs grew from Conley 
 
155 See, e.g., Kendall W. Hannon, Comment, Much Ado About Twombly?  A Study on 
the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1811, 1815 (2008) (concluding from an initial study of Twombly that the new plausibili-
ty standard had “almost no substantive impact,” except in civil rights cases (emphasis in 
original)).  Importantly, these speculations largely related only to Twombly and did not 
predict Iqbal’s strengthening of the plausibility standard.  Nevertheless, even after Iq-
bal, some commentators refuse to acknowledge that the recent Supreme Court rulings 
ushered in a new era of pleading and insist that the decisions have not significantly al-
tered how courts evaluate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  See, e.g., Has 
the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 21-23 (2009) (statement of Gregory G. Garre, Partner, Latham & 
Watkins LLP), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4189 
(under “Witness Testimony”) (concluding that Twombly and Iqbal have not led to 
“wholesale dismissal of claims”).  Still, others occupy a more middle ground, declining 
to paint the new decisions as contrary to traditional pleading practice and attempting 
instead to reconcile the two.  See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After 
Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 474 (2010) (“Rather than decrying Twombly as a radical 
departure and seeking to overturn it, this Article instead emphasizes Twombly’s connec-
tion to prior law and suggests ways in which it can be tamed.”).    
156 See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 600 (asserting that Iqbal increased the rate of 
dismissal sufficiently to “reject the null hypothesis” that the ruling had no effect on 
12(b)(6) motions).  
157 Readers should note that the study observed this difference despite excluding 
from its sample prisoner complaints reviewed under the PLRA and complaints submit-
ted with an application to proceed in forma pauperis.  See id. at 585.  Although such an 
exclusion, the author notes, is necessary to make the study sound because slight incon-
sistencies may inhere in pleading standards for these claims and because the risk of 
bias is particularly acute, in practice these complaints are overwhelmingly filed by pro 
se litigants and are subject to an analysis similar to Iqbal’s.  See Rosenbloom, supra note 
5, at 322, 324-25 (noting that almost all pro se litigants proceed in forma pauperis and 
that a significant number are inmates).  Accordingly, the actual discrepancy may be 
even more pronounced than that which the study observed. 
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(67%) . . . to Iqbal (85%).”158  Thus, pro se complaints have expe-
rienced nearly a twenty percent hike in the rate at which they are dis-
missed, which is double that experienced by all suits generally.  In ad-
dition to the increased rate of dismissal, a disparate impact exists 
between regimes.  Whereas courts dismissed approximately thirty per-
cent more pro se complaints than represented complaints under Con-
ley, after Iqbal, the difference grew to approximately thirty-eight per-
cent.159  The two-pronged plausibility standard, then, is empirically less 
friendly to pro se complaints than it is to those drafted by counsel. 
Also troubling is the effect that grants of dismissal have on pro se 
complaints.  Two statistics are particularly worrisome:  “[t]he relative 
risk of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint be-
ing granted without leave to amend, rather than denied, is over five 
times greater . . . than for a represented plaintiff,”160 and “[t]he odds 
that a pro se plaintiff’s complaint would be entirely dismissed upon the 
grant of a 12(b)(6) motion were 3.48 times greater than a represented 
plaintiff’s.”161  Together with the grossly disproportionate dismissal 
rate of pro se suits exacerbated by Iqbal, these numbers illustrate that 
plausibility will prevent pro se litigants from accessing discovery more 
often than represented litigants.  The greater-than-average number of 
claims asserted and defendants named by pro se litigants162 highlights 
the significance of this concentrated impact. 
Thus, Iqbal appears to have emasculated liberal construction as 
the tool by which courts protect pro se litigants.  Regardless of wheth-
er it was effective enough under the “no set of facts” standard, liberal 
construction now surely demands reinvigoration if pro se litigants with 
meritorious claims are to have a fair chance at accessing discovery.163  
 
158 Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 615. 
159 Id. at 633 tbl.G. 
160 Id. at 621 (emphasis added). 
161 Id. at 623-24. 
162 See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 322-23 tbl.II (presenting data showing the 
greater incidence of multiple defendants in pro se cases). 
163 See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 615 (detailing the increased rate at which pro se 
complaints are dismissed to conclude that “the boilerplate language that pro se plain-
tiffs’ complaints should be treated with leniency is not taken very seriously” (footnotes 
omitted)).  For a similar suggestion that the new pleading practice established by Iqbal is 
out of step with normative policies underlying civil rights legislation and should there-
fore be reconsidered, see Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil 
Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157 (2010).  Although there is no abundance 
of legislation protecting pro se litigants of the sort that exists with respect to civil rights, 
our historical regard for the right to prosecute a case without counsel suggests that 
there is what Professor Wasserman terms a “procedural mismatch” between plausibility 
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Doing so, however, requires understanding the reasons for plausibili-
ty’s disproportionate hostility. 
3.  Explanations for the Disproportionate Increase 
in Pro Se Dismissals  
The now-retired “no set of facts” standard contained only one 
step, which did not by its own terms disproportionately attack pro se 
pleadings.  Only by manipulation did some courts circumvent its low 
threshold to dismiss what were arguably too many pro se complaints.  
By contrast, however, the modern plausibility analysis has two steps, 
both of which require of courts what, under Conley, was done covertly 
and without Supreme Court endorsement:  disregarding conclusory 
factual allegations and subjecting plaintiffs’ theories of liability to 
possible competing inferences.  Each of these steps, though, is uni-
quely poised to disproportionately impact pro se pleadings. 
a.  Necessarily Conclusory Allegations 
Pro se litigants’ circumstances—both economic and nonecon-
omic—render them substantially more likely to articulate claims us-
ing what many courts will deem conclusory allegations.164  Conse-
quently, pro se complaints will be stripped of meaningful allegations 
without regard for their relationship to surrounding averments.  In-
deed, the likelihood that this will occur is heightened by judicial dis-
favor of pro se claims, which largely goes unchecked due to the “con-
clusory” label’s malleability165 and the relative difficulty in successfully 
appealing these determinations. 
First, plaintiffs who are forced to proceed pro se by insolvency will 
lack the financial wherewithal to conduct the sort of prefiling discovery 
necessary to draft sufficiently specific allegations.166  Purely legal con-
 
pleading and the policies articulated by liberal construction.  It is this mismatch that this 
Comment seeks to resolve by reforming the treatment of pro se pleadings. 
164 See supra subsection I.B.3 (surveying the general challenges faced by pro se 
litigants in crafting acceptable complaints, including those that may lead to less spe-
cific allegations). 
165 See Kilaru, supra note 122, at 919-20 (asserting that the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Iqbal highlight just how “manipulable” the distinction between conclusory 
and nonconclusory allegations can be).  
166 See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff With Unquenchable Fire:  What Two Doc-
trinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 
1257 (2008) (“Whether prudent or not, gathering additional factual information to 
include in the complaint is not costless.”); see also Bone, supra note 100, at 860-61 
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clusions of the sort considered in Twombly should not be affected, but 
factual averments and mixed statements of law and fact upon which 
they rely, like those disregarded in Iqbal, will certainly be impacted.  
Nowhere will this reality manifest itself more obviously than in plead-
ing mental state, an element without which certain claims, particularly 
ones concerning civil rights, cannot proceed.167  These, however, are 
precisely the claims that a vast majority of pro se litigants pursue.168  
Without some form of documentation of defendants’ motive in discrim-
ination suits, for example, pro se plaintiffs will be relegated to pleading 
purpose quite generally.169  Such generality very well may prove fatal to 
the allegations and, consequently, the complaint as a whole.  In fact, it 
proved fatal with respect to Javaid Iqbal’s complaint,170 but a poor pro 
se litigant presumably would have even less of an opportunity to dis-
cover relevant facts before filing than did Iqbal’s lawyer. 
Second, even pro se litigants with adequate funds to conduct in-
formal discovery before filing suit will have allegations ignored as con-
clusory.  Without legal training, pro se litigants are much more likely 
to rely upon pleading templates for guidance.171  A review of Form 11, 
 
(showing that conclusory allegations are those that are stated at “too high a level of 
generality” and therefore need further factual support). 
167 See Kilaru, supra note 122, at 927-28 (asserting that information about a defen-
dant’s mental state is difficult to discover, but, without adequately pleading mental 
state, motive-based tort claims are likely to fail); see also Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil 
Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 498 (1989) (“[I]n numerous civil rights suits, 
considerable information important to the factual preparation of complaints that ap-
pear specific will be in the records or minds of government or corporate defendants 
and cannot be secured before these pleadings must be filed, becoming available only 
during discovery.”). 
168 See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 613 (discussing data showing that about half of 
the civil rights cases studied in the article were initiated pro se); Rosenbloom, supra 
note 5, at 320 (noting that in a study of pro se litigants, the most common complaints 
were civil rights actions). 
169 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure endorse general allegations regarding 
elements of this nature.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (permitting “[m]alice, intent, know-
ledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind [to] be alleged generally”).  However, 
the majority in Iqbal asserted that this rule “merely excuses a party from . . . an elevated 
pleading standard” of the sort imposed upon claims of fraud by Rule 9(b).  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).  Therefore, even allegations of discriminatory in-
tent, and other states of mind, are subject to the limitation on conclusory statements.    
170 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (concluding that Iqbal’s “complaint fail[ed] to 
plead sufficient facts”). 
171 That proponents of strengthening pro se assistance advocate for increased 
access to such materials demonstrates pro se litigants’ substantial reliance on them.  
See, e.g., VanWormer, supra note 20, at 1014-15 (considering as necessary to assist pro 
se litigants a “centralized clearinghouse” through which pro se litigants can access 
“printable forms necessary to initiate a case and make motions, as well as instructional 
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appended to the Federal Rules,172 though, demonstrates that following 
these exemplars may prove detrimental to pro se litigants.  The 
Form 11 model encourages plaintiffs to plead negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle without asserting what aspect of the defendant’s driving 
was negligent, such as, for example, swerving or speeding.173  However, 
“it is difficult to see the difference between this negligence allegation 
and the key allegations [disregarded] in Iqbal.”174  The likelihood that 
these allegations are ignored is not only attributable to their obvious 
level of generality, but also to their resemblance to legal conclusions, 
which courts have long excluded from consideration.175  Thus, the 
Federal Rules entice pro se litigants to plead using shorthand factual 
allegations,176 while courts, with Supreme Court approval, are apt to 
punish them for doing so.177  In this way, pro se litigants are unusually 
disadvantaged by the first prong of the plausibility analysis. 
By excluding critical allegations from consideration, courts are 
able to more easily deem a complaint’s theory implausible.178  Thus, 
judicial power to disregard “direct allegations of liability-creating con-
duct” can be wielded to dismiss disfavored claims by disfavored par-
 
materials related to the filing of such forms”).  The importance of the forms appended 
to the Federal Rules cannot be overstated, as their primary architect, Charles Clark, 
considered them “the most important part of the rules” concerning pleading.  See 
Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958) (“We re-
quire a general statement.  How much?  Well, the answer is made in what I think is 
probably the most important part of the rules so far as this particular topic is con-
cerned, namely, the Forms.”).  
172 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (setting forth the minimal allegations necessary to 
plead basic negligence, including date, place, and that the defendant “negligently 
drove a motor vehicle” resulting in injury to plaintiff). 
173 See Bone, supra note 100, at 861 (acknowledging that Form 11 makes no men-
tion of what defendant’s car did to hit plaintiff or why it is alleged to have constituted 
negligence).  
174 Id.  For one court’s acknowledgement that Iqbal calls into question the continu-
ing viability of the Federal Rule Forms, see Doe ex rel. Gonzalez v. Butte Valley Unified 
School District, No. 09-0245, 2009 WL 2424608, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009). 
175 See Ides, supra note 139, at 612 (asserting that the allegation of negligence in 
Form 9 is both a conclusion of law and an “assertion of fact . . . that . . . defendant 
drove in a manner below the standard of due care”); see also Bone, supra note 100, at 
866 (“Today, it is settled law that a judge deciding a 12(b)(6) motion need not accept 
legal conclusions . . . as true.” (citation omitted)). 
176 See FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules 
and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”). 
177 The inconsistency perhaps stems from the Supreme Court’s circumvention of the 
appropriate rulemaking process by which to affect formal changes to pleading doctrine. 
178 See Bone, supra note 100, at 861-62 (claiming that the Iqbal majority made it eas-
ier to conclude that the complaint failed the second prong by aggressively using the 
first prong). 
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ties.179  The legal community’s negative perception of pro se litigants 
makes them likely targets of such unequal use of this discretionary au-
thority.180  Bias against pro se litigants, though, even more deeply in-
fects Iqbal’s second prong. 
b.  Biased Plausibility 
While earlier developments in summary judgment practice pro-
vide general insight into how pleading standards have changed,181 
one particular parallel has unfortunately emerged for pro se litigants.  
It is the potential for judicial “cognitive illiberalism”182:  “an inability 
to recognize how cultural background influences one’s own (as op-
posed to others’) decisionmaking.”183  Indeed, the likelihood that 
such cognitive biases infect determinations is greatest at the pleading 
stage, during which neither party introduces evidence for considera-
tion by the judge.184 
Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman studied Scott v. Harris, in 
which the Supreme Court relied on a video of a high-speed chase to re-
consider a trial court’s factual findings and ultimately reverse its denial 
of summary judgment.185  The Court held that no reasonable juror 
could find that the respondent, the fleeing driver, did not pose a dead-
ly risk to the public, thus warranting the force used by police to end 
the chase.186  A study of the public’s own reactions to the video, howev-
 
179 Burbank, supra note 16, at 117 (asserting that by giving judges the power to dis-
regard factual allegations, Iqbal strengthened plausibility as “an invitation to the lower 
federal courts to screen out complaints in disfavored classes of cases”).  
180 See supra subsection I.B.3 (discussing bias against pro se litigants). 
181 For a detailed discussion of the lessons about pleading that can be learned 
from summary judgment, see generally Hoffman, supra note 166, at 1240-43. For a 
more extreme take on the links between the two procedural devices, see Thomas, supra 
note 92, at 28-34. 
182 See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You 
Going to Believe?  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
837, 842-43 (2009) (coining the term and explaining its effect on the Court’s decision 
to grant summary judgment). 
183 Christopher Slobogin, The Perils of the Fight Against Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/slobogin.pdf. 
184 See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?, supra note 121, at 
12-13 (explaining that the prejudicial effect of “cognitive illiberalism” is more “worri-
some” at the motion to dismiss stage because of the lack of an evidentiary record). 
185 See 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (finding a police officer entitled to summary 
judgment). 
186 See id. (“The car chase that respondent initiated in this case posed a substantial 
and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others; no reasonable jury could con-
clude otherwise.”). 
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er, indicated the contrary.  Members of certain subcommunities sharing 
common experiences and values—eerily reminiscent of the experience 
and common sense referred to in Iqbal—perceived less danger in the 
plaintiff’s flight and attributed more responsibility to police.187 
According to the authors, this division demonstrated that the 
Court operated in a state of cognitive illiberalism; it displayed “over-
confidence in the unassailable correctness of [its] factual percep-
tions . . . and unwarranted contempt for [contrary] perceptions.”188  
The potential for the same “type of decisionmaking hubris”189 to afflict 
courts’ determinations on the plausibility of plaintiffs’ claims is signif-
icant.  The analysis requires courts to imagine other possible explana-
tions for allegations put forth in complaints,190 which courts may favor 
if they more closely align with the judges’ predispositions or expe-
riences.  Indeed, the Supreme Court endorsed a process similar to this 
bias by emphasizing “judicial experience and common sense” as the 
lens through which to evaluate plausibility.191 
The subjectivity that inheres in the comparative endeavor por-
tends special trouble for pro se litigants and the liberal construction 
afforded their complaints.192  As a group, pro se litigants have “identi-
ty-defining characteristics” that differ from lower court judges.193  Un-
like members of the federal bench and their clerks, for example, a 
majority of pro se litigants are black, Asian, or Hispanic.194  Kahan and 
 
187 See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 841 (noting that segments of 
the public that value egalitarianism and social solidarity more than hierarchy and indi-
vidualism tended to disagree with the Court’s conclusion in Scott v. Harris). 
188 Id. at 843. 
189 Id. at 842. 
190 See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 
2008) (“The plausibility of an explanation depends on the plausibility of the alterna-
tive explanations.”). 
191 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (noting that a court must 
draw on its “judicial experience and common sense” when determining the plausibility 
of a claim); Burbank, supra note 16, at 118 (“The Iqbal Court’s reliance on ‘judicial ex-
perience and common sense’ is, in certain types of cases, an invitation to ‘cognitive 
illiberalism’ . . . .”). 
192 See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 30-31 (noting that the rule set forth 
in Haines runs into trouble because “plausibility is inherently subjective and judges likely 
gauge ‘plausibility’ differently based on their ideologies, attitudes, and experiences”). 
193 See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 879 (asserting that individ-
uals whose opinions differed from the Court’s shared “a core of identity-defining 
characteristics”). 
194 See OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS:  CHARACTERISTICS, NEEDS, SERVICES 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/AJJI_SelfRep06.pdf (reporting that over eighty per-
cent of pro se litigants surveyed were not Caucasian). 
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his coauthors observed that racial differences can result in not only 
opposing perceptions of a set of facts, but, more importantly, conflict-
ing conclusions based thereon.195  The difference manifests in the par-
ties these populations tend to support, with minorities favoring plain-
tiffs more often than Causasians.196  Furthermore, poorer pro se liti-
litigants tend to harbor a greater level of suspicion toward authority 
figures.197  That most pro se litigants sue governmental officials198 
renders this difference critical to plausibility decisions because 
courts—significant wielders of authority themselves—may uninten-
tionally favor alternative, lawful explanations for alleged official mis-
conduct.199  In fact, pro se litigants’ distrust of the court system over 
which judges exercise control exacerbates the disconnect.200  These, as 
well as other, influential differences between pro se litigants and the 
courts evaluating their complaints201 raise the specter of unintentional 
privileging of competing inferences.202 
Accordingly, without a version of liberal construction that ade-
quately accounts for the change in pleading standards that Iqbal fina-
lized, courts risk alienating a group of citizens by summarily dismiss-
ing their claims as undeserving of discovery.  The result is particularly 
ironic because pro se litigants are the only group of litigants selected 
for special accommodations at the pleading stage of litigation. 
 
195 Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 867. 
196 See id. (finding that African Americans were significantly more likely to find for 
plaintiffs than Caucasians).  
197 See id. at 879-80 (noting that differences, including degrees of wealth, affected 
whether individuals “view[ed] those in authority with trust or suspicion”). 
198 See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 323 (“Almost four out of every five pro se cases 
were filed against at least one government defendant.”). 
199 See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 
1154 (2008) (“[T]he courts tend to reflect the insider view that discrimination is rare 
and that most claims are meritless, rather than the opposing view that discrimination is 
pervasive.”)  For an assertion that the majority in Iqbal displayed these institutional bi-
asing effects, see Spencer, supra note 119, at 197-99. 
200 See supra subsection I.B.2 (listing the reasons that litigants choose to proceed 
pro se, which include distrust for lawyers and the legal system in general). 
201 For an acknowledgement that judges as a group may differ in their explana-
tions of facts from other groups as a result of “legal and judicial professionalization,” 
see Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 883. 
202 This discussion should be read neither to insinuate bad faith on the part of 
federal judges construing pro se complaints nor to deny the myriad differences be-
tween federal pro se litigants.  Instead, it is intended merely to call attention to the po-
tential for the plausibility inquiry to disadvantage certain pro se complaints that an 
identifiable group of self-represented litigants tend to pursue and that implicate the 
courts’ inherent trust in official behavior.  
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III.  REFASHIONING LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION 
IN A POST-PLAUSIBILITY ERA 
Liberal construction’s commendable components—the most not-
able of which is the judicial practice of inferring the correct cause of 
action from complaints invoking an incorrect one203—should be re-
tained because plausibility has not rendered them unfit to accommo-
date pro se litigants.  However, as a rule meant to support meritorious 
pro se litigation, liberal construction should be strengthened to ac-
count for the difficulties the new plausibility standard presents.204  First, 
courts should demand less specificity of factual allegations drafted by 
pro se litigants in order to comport with the policy underlying liberal 
construction.  Second, favored competing inferences must be transpa-
rent in order to prevent pro se litigants from repeating the errors that 
initially caused dismissal when amending their complaints.205 
A.  Restraining Judicial Authority to Carve Complaints 
Although Erickson presaged Iqbal’s negative impact on pro se 
complaints,206 the Supreme Court’s decision also suggested a way to 
mitigate the troublesome effect:  restrain courts’ discretion to disre-
gard allegations they deem conclusory.207  Building upon this founda-
tion, liberal construction should require courts to consider all pro se 
 
203 See, e.g., Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the 
lower court should have treated a pro se plaintiff’s claim as one made pursuant to 
§ 1983, despite having been styled as one for habeas corpus).  
204 Notably, these challenges emerged prior to Twombly as a result of lower courts’ 
informal elevation of pleading requirements.  Thus, even if Congress overturns Twom-
bly and Iqbal by statute, see, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 
111th Cong. (2009), these adaptations would still help to ensure that pro se litigants 
receive the accommodations necessary to protect their access to courts. 
205 These recommendations are an attempt to adapt to the new plausibility stan-
dard, rather than to repudiate it as an incorrect construction of federal pleading re-
quirements.  They would most appropriately be implemented by judicial decree, just as 
was liberal construction itself.  Indeed, a modified rule of liberal construction is ill-
suited to both the rulemaking and legislative processes.  The Federal Rules are trans-
substantive, rendering a party-specific rule anathema.  And, while the federal govern-
ment has codified special pleading requirements in the past, in this context, an ana-
logous statute would unnecessarily constrain the judicial flexibility needed to 
accommodate pro se litigants.  
206 See supra subsection II.B.1 (explaining why Erickson provides little assurance 
that liberal construction as presently practiced will meet the challenges facing pro se 
litigants post-Iqbal). 
207 See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (admonishing the 
lower court for dismissing allegations as conclusory when they were adequate to “put 
the[] matters in issue”). 
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allegations in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion unless they are pure 
legal conclusions.  That way, courts will not unintentionally punish 
pro se litigants for crafting allegations as specifically as their circums-
tances and legal acumen permit. 
Strengthening liberal construction with such a supplement is not 
without support in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  For exam-
ple, Rule 1 instructs courts to construe and administer the Rules to 
ensure “just” determinations.208  Similarly, Rule 8(e) demands that 
“[p]leadings . . . be construed so as to do justice.”209  With a principled 
distinction between conclusory and acceptable factual allegations 
evading even the strongest legal minds,210 pro se litigants most certain-
ly cannot be expected to grasp the difference.  A lack of experience 
with courts exascerbates this inability, as increased interaction with 
the courts would provide them, as it does practicing lawyers, an intui-
tive sense of how judges decide Rule 12(b)(6) motions.211  Accordingly, 
to administer pleading requirements to ensure fair results, pro se liti-
gants should be better insulated from the admonition against conclu-
sory factual allegations that they are unable to identify ex ante.212 
To implement this rule, however, a principled distinction must 
still be established between purely legal conclusions and general or 
shorthand factual allegations, and it must be one that pro se litigants 
can fairly be expected to comprehend.213  For purposes of liberally 
 
208 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (requiring that the Rules “be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”). 
209 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e). 
210 See Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921) (rejecting the assumption “that there is some clear, easily 
drawn and scientific distinction” between facts and conclusions aside from the level of 
specificity at which they are stated).  Indeed, the endeavor proved so difficult that the 
drafters of the Federal Rules abandoned it altogether.  See Burbank, supra note 16, at 
115 (“Yet, an important reason why the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules rejected fact 
pleading is that one person’s ‘factual allegation’ is another’s ‘conclusion.’” (citing Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 574-75 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).   
211 See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice?  
An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1235, 1252-53 (2006) (“[A]s experts and repeat players in the court system, litigat-
ing attorneys should have . . . better access to information about what the . . . judge 
likely will do.”). 
212 For the origins of this functional argument, see Email from Stephen B. Bur-
bank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to author (Nov. 11, 2009, 
14:52 EST) (on file with author).  
213 Although any attempt to distinguish between legal conclusions and factual al-
legations superficially harkens back to code pleading, which has long been rejected, 
the gloss that follows does not resuscitate the hypertechnical distinctions of yore.  Ra-
ther, it seeks to establish a uniquely low specificity threshold beyond which allegations 
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construing pro se complaints, then, legal conclusions that courts need 
not presume true should be only those in which pro se plaintiffs assert 
that defendants’ conduct either (1) amounts to a violation of the law 
or (2) satisfies an element of the alleged offense in obviously “canoni-
cal form.”214  All other allegations, including the mixed statements of 
law and fact that comprise the majority of complaints, should be pre-
sumed true.  For example, a pro se prisoner’s averment that a particu-
lar punishment constituted retaliation for free speech, and therefore 
violated the First Amendment, would not pass muster.  By contrast, if 
that same plaintiff alleged that a prison guard subjected her to harsh 
conditions of confinement because of complaints she made about the 
guard’s behavior, the statement would be presumptively entitled to 
consideration in determining the complaint’s plausibility.  Simply put, 
courts should accept general statements regarding objectively verifia-
ble facts, but reject legal determinations supposed to be made from 
those statements:  the motive for certain conduct can be confirmed or 
disproved by evidence, while that conduct’s constitutionality is a de-
termination made only in light of such evidence.215 
Severely curtailing courts’ ability to carve conclusory factual alle-
gations from pro se complaints errs on the side of considering allega-
tions and thereby heightens the chance that claims are deemed plaus-
 
are entitled to the presumption of truth for one particular subgroup of litigants 
whom courts have singled out for special treatment due to policy considerations.  In 
that regard, it benefits from the work of a leading scholar during the code-pleading 
era and one of its strongest critics, Walter Wheeler Cook, who believed that factual 
specificity differentiates conclusions from allegations and that the required amount of 
specificity should comport with “notions of fairness and convenience.”  Cook, supra 
note 210, at 422-23.  
214 See Bone, supra note 100, at 867 n.94 (suggesting that one extreme way to nar-
row the class of excludable conclusions is to limit it to “allegations that simply insert 
‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’ into a legal proposition otherwise stated in some recogniza-
bly canonical form”).  
215 See id. at 873-74 (discussing objectively verifiable facts in the context of plausi-
bility analysis).  Drawing the line at objective verifiability comports with the previous 
acknowledgment that Form 11 should be sufficient to entitle pro se plaintiffs to dis-
covery.  It requires a plaintiff claiming basic negligence to state only, “On [X] date, at 
[X] place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.”  FED. 
R. CIV. P. Form 11.  Its use of the term “negligently,” however, is not a legal conclusion 
that can be disregarded, but rather just a description of the defendant’s driving, like 
“sporadic” or “substandard,” which can be objectively verified through discovery.  See 
supra subsection II.B.3.a (discussing Form 11 as endorsing shorthand factual allega-
tions).  Accordingly, similar descriptive terms that resemble legal conclusions should 
not be disregarded when liberally construing pro se complaints.  Cf. Bone, supra note 
100, at 873-74 (explaining that some conclusory statements do provide the court with a 
sufficient basis to evaluate a claim’s success under the plausibility standard).  
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ible.216  However, this recommendation should not be interpreted to 
strip courts of their ability to dismiss overly fanciful or clearly outra-
geous claims and claims for which there is absolutely no valid basis in 
the law because the plausibility prong remains intact.  Therefore, such 
claims—the majority of which are admittedly pursued pro se217—will 
not survive motions to dismiss despite the change outlined above.  Al-
though similarly emasculating Iqbal’s first prong may be prudent for 
entire classes of claims involving hard-to-verify facts, the transsubstan-
tive application of the Federal Rules would not permit such a devel-
opment.  However, because pro se litigants have already been selected 
for special treatment, transsubstantivity should not block their en-
titlement to a less stringent version of Iqbal’s first prong. 
B.  Making Inferences Transparent to Assist with Complaint Amendments 
Courts are presently amenable to granting pro se litigants leave to 
amend their complaints.218  Although exceedingly liberal access to 
amendments should be retained for pro se plaintiffs, such access is of 
little use when unaccompanied by transparent explanations as to why 
particular complaints are insufficient.219  Failures to set forth such ex-
planations are likely to increase post-Iqbal because of the subjectivity 
that inheres in plausibility analysis and courts’ inability to recognize 
that perceptions of factual circumstances differ among groups.220  Ac-
cordingly, the inferences that courts believe render theories of 
wrongdoing implausible should be made clear so pro se litigants can 
 
216 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959-60 (2009) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (agreeing with the majority that, without the factual allegations disregarded as 
conclusory, the complaint failed to state a plausible claim to relief); Bone, supra note 
100, at 861-62 (noting that Iqbal’s first prong “did all the work” by making it easy to 
conclude that the complaint did not raise a plausible inference of wrongdoing). 
217 See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation:  A Crit-
ical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1142 
(1994) (“[P]ro se litigants file a large proportion of the nut claims.”). 
218 See, e.g., Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A] pro 
se complaint . . . should not [be] dismiss[ed] without granting leave to amend at least 
once . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)). 
219 See Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and 
Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se:  Causes, Solutions, Recom-
mendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 436-40 (2004) (discussing 
transparency as essential to providing pro se litigants meaningful judicial accommoda-
tions and noting that explanation is a “particularly important” component of that 
transparency). 
220 For a fuller discussion of this type of unintentional decisionmaking confidence 
or “hubris,” see supra subsection II.B.3.b.  
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better supplement their complaints to undercut the viability of those 
inferences and thereby increase the plausibility of their own.221 
A heightened sense of “judicial humility”222 in drawing competing 
inferences is perhaps the first step toward increasing the aforemen-
tioned transparency.  Courts should second-guess their disregard for 
inferences upon which pro se plaintiffs rely to ensure that their disbe-
lief is not motivated by a difference in values or predispositions, but 
rather by a more neutral conviction that the inferences would not per-
suade individuals sharing even the litigants’ “identity-defining” 
traits.223  That way, courts will be both less likely to alienate pro se liti-
gants by discounting inferences that these litigants, as a recognizable 
group, deem credible, and better able to identify favored competing 
inferences when granting leave to amend.  As a result, pro se litigants 
will understand the allegations requiring additional factual enhance-
ment to make the necessary, but unmade, inferences plausible and 
limit courts’ skepticism.  Indeed, including suggestions in the opinion 
as to the types of support needed to sustain missing elements would 
be advisable, as pro se litigants may otherwise neglect to include all 
the facts within their possession on the assumption that complaints 
should be as “short and plain” as possible.224 
In fact, despite having unabashedly privileged its own perception 
of the facts alleged in Iqbal, one redeeming quality of the majority’s 
opinion in that case is its presentation of the competing inference 
that, for five Justices, made Iqbal’s claim implausible.  In particular, 
the majority expressly stated its belief that, in light of the recent Sep-
 
221 A related approach would permit plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery to 
quell courts’ skepticism as to plausibility.  See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading 
and Heavy Lifting:  How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on 
Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 140 (2010) (“Where the complaint’s 
implausibility is due to an informational inequity, an opportunity to re-plead does little 
good without some narrow discovery to ameliorate the problem.”).  Additional trans-
parency would work well in conjunction with predismissal discovery because it would 
direct the discovery and thereby limit its cost. 
222 See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 897-99 (defining “judicial 
humility” as a way by which judges can prevent privileging value-laden perceptions 
over competing perceptions likely made by groups with different “identity-defining 
characteristics”). 
223 See id. at 898-99 (urging a process whereby judges reconsider their conclusions 
that no reasonable juror could find wrongdoing to make sure that they do not deni-
grate the views of particular communities that perceive facts differently). 
224 For a compelling discussion of why “cause of action” information should not 
generate concerns over judicial partiality, see Jona Goldschmidt, Judicial Assistance to 
Self-Represented Litigants:  Lessons from the Canadian Experience, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 
601, 622-23 (2009).  
SCHNEIDER FINAL REVISED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2010  11:44 AM 
630 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 585 
tember 11th attacks, the high-ranking officials likely placed Iqbal in 
restrictive confinement because of his suspected terrorist connections 
and not on account of his nationality or race.225  At least, then, if Iqbal 
had not retained counsel, his opportunity to amend the complaint 
would remain meaningful.  Iqbal could have, for instance, alleged de-
ficient intelligence connecting him to terrorism in order to rebut the 
Court’s conviction that defendants acted lawfully and render the pro-
posed inference of wrongdoing plausible.  To go one step further, 
discussing the type of factual support tending to adequately “show” 
motive in the relevant context would at least place him on a more lev-
el playing field with litigants whose lawyers understand the type of 
support required to succeed.226 
Although post-analysis treatment of pro se complaints cannot 
properly be labeled a method of liberal construction, it is nevertheless 
a critical extension of the leeway given pro se litigants at the pleading 
stage of litigation.  The present liberal amendment practice with re-
spect to pro se litigants cannot compensate adequately for the pleading 
developments Iqbal enshrined unless significant transparency is infused 
into the highly subjective second prong of the analysis.  Discerning 
competing inferences that must be rebutted is a daunting task for law-
yers well-versed in drafting complaints, let alone pro se litigants.  Thus, 
like limiting the grant of authority to disregard conclusory allegations, 
requiring greater explanation as to the deficiencies courts perceive in 
pro se complaints will promote the goal of liberal construction.227 
C.  Addressing Concerns Related to Neutrality, Caseload, and Abuse 
Pro se advocacy necessarily arouses concerns over judicial neutral-
ity, docket burden, and litigation abuse.  Accordingly, it is important 
to address these concerns because the techniques set forth above 
will, as intended, lead to pro se litigants accessing discovery in great-
er numbers.  These issues, though, fail to counsel convincingly 
against a more robust version of liberal construction, particularly in 
 
225 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009) (noting that all the alleged 
nonconclusory facts can be read to suggest is that defendants placed plaintiff in restric-
tive confinement because he was a suspected terrorist, which does not plausibly suggest 
invidious discrimination).  
226 For a similar suggestion that instructions to pro se litigants be included in or-
ders granting leave to amend so that they can correct defects in their complaints, see 
Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 64, at 211. 
227 See supra Section III.A (articulating a functional argument for constraining 
judicial capacity to disregard “conclusory” allegations based upon Rules 1 and 8(e)). 
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light of the alternative mechanisms available by which to check ex-
cessive pro se litigation. 
Some commentators—most notably Judge Bacharach and Profes-
sor Entzeroth—argue against robust liberal construction because, in 
their opinion, it destroys judicial neutrality.228  However, their criticism 
does not target adaptations like the first supplement to liberal con-
struction proposed above.  Constraining courts’ authority to disregard 
factual allegations does not require judges to treat pro se complaints 
in a manner that conflicts with their authors’ intentions.  In fact, it ac-
complishes quite the opposite.  Requiring courts to accept more alle-
gations as presented by pro se litigants will better align their treatment 
of pro se complaints with litigants’ expectations, precisely the goal of 
Bacharach and Entzeroth’s critique.229  Moreover, while concerns 
about judicial partiality are perhaps more relevant to the second sup-
plement proposed herein, they are still insufficient to counsel against 
its implementation.  Increasing transparency with respect to pro se 
complaints aids self-represented litigants by making meaningful 
amendments more accessible.  However, it requires judges neither to 
substantially alter the process by which they evaluate the sufficiency of 
pro se complaints nor to advocate on behalf of pro se litigants by af-
firmatively correcting substantive inadequacies. 
While these proposals separately fail to blur the line between neu-
trality and advocacy, together they do warrant skepticism regarding 
the increased workload that will result from their implementation.  
Nonetheless, several observations allay these concerns.  First, early sta-
tistics indicate that Twombly and Iqbal may actually decrease the num-
ber of pro se suits that are filed in the first place.230  Thus, to the ex-
tent that this trend continues, it may negate at least some of the extra 
workload shouldered by courts overseeing more pro se discovery.  In-
deed, one of the benefits of working within the plausibility regime (ra-
ther than exempting pro se litigants from it completely) is the stan-
dard’s ability to discourage less meritorious filings.  In addition, 
limiting the effort required of judges liberally construing pro se com-
plaints could counterbalance the resulting increase in discovery-
 
228 See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 42 (“The effort to equalize adver-
sarial ability is a futile endeavor, but the hopelessness of the task is not the greatest 
danger.  Instead, the greater danger is the loosening of the well-designed constraints 
on the role of the judiciary in the adversarial process.”).  
229 See id. at 43 (“The key to construction of pro se pleadings involves an under-
standing of what the litigant has said.”).  
230 See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 613 (“Interestingly, the percentage of pro se 
plaintiffs . . . declined from Conley (30%) to Twombly (27%) to Iqbal (24%).”).  
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related burdens.  The reductions in time and energy spent parsing 
conclusory from nonconclusory allegations and reconsidering 
amended complaints should permit courts to dedicate more attention 
to pro se cases after deciding motions to dismiss. 
A related issue to which many attribute the recent shift in plead-
ing standards involves discovery costs incurred by defendants and the 
potential for abusive litigation.  This concern is particularly acute in 
the context of pro se litigation, which admittedly involves more unme-
ritorious claims.  However, the costs likely to result from more pro se 
discovery will not be grave because pro se claims are on the whole 
much simpler than actions pursued with counsel.231  Their simplicity 
renders pro se claims particularly amenable to supervised discovery, 
which should quickly reveal to defendants whether or not a summary 
judgment motion would succeed.  In addition, the leeway afforded pro 
se litigants does not exempt them from Rule 11 sanctions for failing to 
affirm (1) that “reasonable prefiling inquiry has shown that a filing’s 
claims and assertions are ‘well grounded in fact and [are] warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for [a change] of existing law’” 
and (2) that “the filing ‘is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation.’”232  These sanctions should continue to deter 
some of the excesses that have come to characterize pro se cases. 
Leaving the gate to discovery slightly more ajar for pro se litigants 
will not grind the gears of our federal judicial system to a halt.  Accor-
dingly, a stronger version of liberal construction is warranted in light 
of the countervailing fairness concerns that underlie the system’s his-
toric support for self-representation. 
CONCLUSION 
Liberal construction developed in response to challenges facing 
pro se litigants that courts identified as having the potential to unfairly 
deny them access to discovery.  As the term itself suggests, those chal-
lenges consisted of the potential for (1) incomprehensible or “inart-
 
231 See supra note 57 (examining the complexity of pro se suits and the burden 
they impose on courts). 
232 Nichols, supra note 49, at 355 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11).  The 1983 revisions 
to Rule 11 eliminated unrepresented litigants’ previous exemption from the Rule’s 
reach.  Id. at 355-56.  Now, “the rule unequivocably reaches the conduct of pro se liti-
gants . . . [and] no federal court may claim that it is powerless to administer [R]ule 11 
sanctions against unrepresented parties whose filings it finds to be frivolous-in-fact, fri-
volous-in-law, or improperly motivated.”  Id. at 357; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
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ful” drafting and (2) incorrect or incomplete invocation of the legal 
bases for claims.  That these difficulties do not include the potential 
for the standard for evaluating complaints to punish pro se litigants 
reflects the background notice-pleading regime under which the 
Supreme Court first granted the leniency.  The Conley “no set of 
facts” standard raised a deceptively low bar to pleading a cause of ac-
tion adequately, thereby posing little threat of inherent unfairness to 
pro se litigants. 
Only through informal channels did lower courts heighten plead-
ing requirements to make suits pursued by particular claimants, in-
cluding pro se litigants, more vulnerable to dismissal for failure to 
state a claim.  The unexpressed nature of this development perhaps 
excuses, or at least explains, the system’s previous failure to reevaluate 
liberal construction as an adequate accommodation to pro se litigants.  
However, Iqbal removed the disguise, ushering in a new era of height-
ened pleading requirements.  Plausibility analysis adds yet another 
unique challenge to the set of concerns initially identified as requiring 
liberal construction of pro se pleadings since each of its prongs unfair-
ly punishes unrepresented litigants.  As a result, courts would be re-
miss not to allow greater leniency for self-represented litigants at the 
pleading stage of litigation. 
This Comment endeavors to provide insight into exactly how the 
plausibility standard disproportionately undercuts the efforts of pro se 
litigants to access discovery in order to highlight why two particular 
supplements to liberal construction are advisable.  Without meaning-
ful adaptations of the sort here proposed, our legal system risks not 
only defying the longstanding statutory protections afforded to the 
right of self-representation, but also infringing upon pro se litigants’ 
constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
 
 
